PART III
Chapter 9 11300 Vanowen
Before Olympic Records
Start-Up (1982)
Pre-production/recordings
Texas Instrument TI-99
Olympic Records Search
Chapter 10 California Corporations
Refusal to incorporate
New York incorporation
Chapter 11 Recording Sessions
For Your Inspiration Only, Kindra Koury
Chapter 12 Thomas Briccetti
Maestro and Mentor
Project with Omaha Symphony
RADIOLYMPIC
Radio Promotion with Stations playing
Major Market Advertising
Instrumental Music Sessions
The Victors, The Victims
Chapter 13 Trademark Office
Registration Refusal
Idyllwild move
Trademark Administrative Court
C.B.S. Television program "Crossroads"
Charles Kuralt and Bill Moyers
First summer from hell
Chapter 14 Washington, D.C. Federal Court
Federal offices closed except federal court
File Complaint
Transfer granted
Chapter 15 Los Angeles Court
First screw in the coffin
Case transfered to Olympic judge
Federal Agencies, States
Department of Justice
Amended Complaint
What would a fifth grader do?
Bill Simon
Chapter 16 Gay Olympics - San Fran. Arts & Athletics
International Olympic Committee
Dr. Thomas Waddell
My case decided by theirs
Meeting of the Parties
Chapter 17 You Lose, Mr. LaBranche
Pursuing the Impossible Dream
Second screw in the coffin
Don Coyote
PART IV
Chapter 18 Appeals Court
Become Private Lobbyist
Take the Case to Congress
277 copies x 555 page record plus video and Petition
Congressional Replies and Committee referrals
Journalists, WSJ reporter
Chapter 19 Summary Judgment
Petition sent to 277 Members of Congress
Chapter 20 The Olympic Record
Newsletter of Olympic Records, Inc.
PART V
Chapter 21 Personal Congressional Petition 373
Section 380
Footnotes and Remarks
Introductory Amendment to section 380
Chapter 22 President Jimmy Carter Appeal
Carter Center
Steve Best, Judiciary Committee staff attorney
Chapter 23 Canada
Blunder Forward
Letter to Canadian Olympic/Olympique
Canada Olympic Businesses
Transcript from C.B.C. producer
Chapter 24 National Association of Olympic Businesses
NAOB Congressional and I.R.S. authorization
First letter of Solicitation for Members
Membership Companies
SECTION VI
Chapter 25 Dissenting Opinion
Judge Alex Kozinski
Three judge dissent
Full Opinion
Chapter 26 NAOB and HR-1988
United States Check-Off Act
Uncontroversial Legislation
Non-Profit List
Chapter 27 Supreme Court takes SFAA
Martian Rules - The Wallaby court
AMICUS CURIAE Arguments
Chapter 28 Linguistic Theft
Hon. Gerry E. Studds
Good-Bye Dr. Waddell - Eulogy
Chapter 29 Michael H. Gottesman
Supreme Court counsel
Conference Transcript
PART VII
Chapter 30 Washington, One More Time
Supreme Court pronouncement
Syllabus and Author's Dissent
Chapter 31 Peter W. Rodino, Jr.
Meeting at the Court
Letter paste
Chapter 32 Dear Owimpic
Last gasp of the pro se litigant
Early Epilog
Appendix Table
Appendix A Pro Se Litigant Information
Appendix B First Amended Complaint
Appendix C Federal Court Evidence Record
Appendix D Legal Brief
Appendix E Tables of Statutes and Case Law
Appendix F Federal Rules of Evidence
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Monday, May 31, 2010
The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix F
APPENDIX F
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
F. R. E. Rule 902(1) & 28 U.S.C. § 1739
1) "[E]vidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required as to a document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States or of any state,. . . " Hunter, Federal Trial handbook 2d, § 58.6 at 679. Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 902(1), as well as upon 28 U.S.C. § 1739, Hunter, Federal Trial Handbook 2d, § 58.7 at 681 and F. R. E. 902(4), Id. at 683 for admissibility of plaintiff's exhibits 27-140.
2) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1739 and F. R. E. 901(b)(7) for admission of exhibits 141-153 of First Amended Complaint.
3) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733, 1739 for admission of exhibits 233, 237, 238, 239-246 (F. R. E. 1003) and 247.
4) Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 803(6), 1001(3), for admission of exhibits 155-158, 160-172, 174-181, 184-196, 197-199, 201-203, 205, 207-220, 222, 224-227, 229, 234-236,248, and 250.
5) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1732 {Federal Business Records Act} for admission of exhibit 504.
6) Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 1006 for admission of exhibits 523-526.
7) Plaintiff relies on presumption "Omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta" as will be indicated by an (* ) in the forthcoming chart.
EXHIBIT NO. EVIDENCE RULE
1-2 28 U.S.C. § 1744.
3-6 F. R. E. 404(b), 405(b).
7-10 F. R. E. 902(6).
11* F. R. E. 1733(b), 1739.
12-14 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
16-22* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1732. 1733(b), 1739.
23-26 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
27-140* F. R. E. 902(4), 28 U.S.C. § 1739.
141-153 F. R. E. 901(b)(7).
154* F. R. E 901(b)(7)
155-158 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
159* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
160-172 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
173* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
174-181 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
183* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
184-196 F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
197-199 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
200* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
201-203 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
204* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
205 F. R. E. 803(6)(8)
206 F. R. E. 901(b)(7), 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b).
207-220 F. R. E. 1001(3)
221* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
222 F. R. E. 803(6)(8)
223 F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
224-227 F. R. E. 1001(3)
228* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
229 F. R. E. 1001(3)
230* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1739
231 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b), 1739
232* F. R. E. 902(4)
233* 28 U.S.C. 1733(b).
234-236 F. R. E. 1001(3)
237* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b)
238* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b)
239-246 F. R. E. 1003
247* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1739
248 F. R. E. 1001(3)
249-250 F. R. E. 1001(3)
251-255* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
256-258* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1739, 1733(b)
259-265* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1739, 1733(b)
267-269 F. R. E. 1006
270-289 28 U.S.C. § 1744
290-295 28 U.S.C. § 1744
297-298* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
299-300 F. R. E. 1006
301-503* F. R. E. 1003
504 28 U.S.C. § 1732
505-520 F. R. E. 1003
521-522* F. R. E. 1003
523-526 F. R. E. 1006
In regard to DOJ appeal No. 85-0521.
Exhibits A - K attached to appeal* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b), 1739.
8) This list of exhibits and the rules under which the plaintiff will rely on at trial are not to be construed as limiting the plaintiff from using other authorities or rules that may be omitted from the instant request.
9) Internal Revenue Service tax I. D. numbers for any company or corporation included in and as exhibits 27-140, 155-158, 160-172, 174-181, 184-196, 197-199, 201-203, 205, 206, 207-220, 222, 223, 224-227, 229, 234-236, 239-246 (Fed. I.R.S. I.D. No. included on these documents), 248, 250, 505-520, 523-526.
10) "Omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta" applies to each exhibit followed by (*).
11) Presumption that rightful owners of property are not likely to permit their property to remain in the continued possession of others that assert title thereto, and that the possession is authorized by some grant or license. Hunter, Federal Trial Handbook 2d, § 54.12 at 648. This presumption applies to trademark registration 968,566 and is equally applicable to section 380.
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
F. R. E. Rule 902(1) & 28 U.S.C. § 1739
1) "[E]vidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required as to a document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States or of any state,. . . " Hunter, Federal Trial handbook 2d, § 58.6 at 679. Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 902(1), as well as upon 28 U.S.C. § 1739, Hunter, Federal Trial Handbook 2d, § 58.7 at 681 and F. R. E. 902(4), Id. at 683 for admissibility of plaintiff's exhibits 27-140.
2) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1739 and F. R. E. 901(b)(7) for admission of exhibits 141-153 of First Amended Complaint.
3) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733, 1739 for admission of exhibits 233, 237, 238, 239-246 (F. R. E. 1003) and 247.
4) Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 803(6), 1001(3), for admission of exhibits 155-158, 160-172, 174-181, 184-196, 197-199, 201-203, 205, 207-220, 222, 224-227, 229, 234-236,248, and 250.
5) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1732 {Federal Business Records Act} for admission of exhibit 504.
6) Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 1006 for admission of exhibits 523-526.
7) Plaintiff relies on presumption "Omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta" as will be indicated by an (* ) in the forthcoming chart.
EXHIBIT NO. EVIDENCE RULE
1-2 28 U.S.C. § 1744.
3-6 F. R. E. 404(b), 405(b).
7-10 F. R. E. 902(6).
11* F. R. E. 1733(b), 1739.
12-14 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
16-22* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1732. 1733(b), 1739.
23-26 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
27-140* F. R. E. 902(4), 28 U.S.C. § 1739.
141-153 F. R. E. 901(b)(7).
154* F. R. E 901(b)(7)
155-158 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
159* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
160-172 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
173* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
174-181 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
183* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
184-196 F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
197-199 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
200* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
201-203 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
204* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
205 F. R. E. 803(6)(8)
206 F. R. E. 901(b)(7), 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b).
207-220 F. R. E. 1001(3)
221* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
222 F. R. E. 803(6)(8)
223 F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
224-227 F. R. E. 1001(3)
228* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
229 F. R. E. 1001(3)
230* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1739
231 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b), 1739
232* F. R. E. 902(4)
233* 28 U.S.C. 1733(b).
234-236 F. R. E. 1001(3)
237* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b)
238* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b)
239-246 F. R. E. 1003
247* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1739
248 F. R. E. 1001(3)
249-250 F. R. E. 1001(3)
251-255* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
256-258* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1739, 1733(b)
259-265* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1739, 1733(b)
267-269 F. R. E. 1006
270-289 28 U.S.C. § 1744
290-295 28 U.S.C. § 1744
297-298* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
299-300 F. R. E. 1006
301-503* F. R. E. 1003
504 28 U.S.C. § 1732
505-520 F. R. E. 1003
521-522* F. R. E. 1003
523-526 F. R. E. 1006
In regard to DOJ appeal No. 85-0521.
Exhibits A - K attached to appeal* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b), 1739.
8) This list of exhibits and the rules under which the plaintiff will rely on at trial are not to be construed as limiting the plaintiff from using other authorities or rules that may be omitted from the instant request.
II
PRESUMPTIONS
9) Internal Revenue Service tax I. D. numbers for any company or corporation included in and as exhibits 27-140, 155-158, 160-172, 174-181, 184-196, 197-199, 201-203, 205, 206, 207-220, 222, 223, 224-227, 229, 234-236, 239-246 (Fed. I.R.S. I.D. No. included on these documents), 248, 250, 505-520, 523-526.
10) "Omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta" applies to each exhibit followed by (*).
11) Presumption that rightful owners of property are not likely to permit their property to remain in the continued possession of others that assert title thereto, and that the possession is authorized by some grant or license. Hunter, Federal Trial Handbook 2d, § 54.12 at 648. This presumption applies to trademark registration 968,566 and is equally applicable to section 380.
The Olympic Record Appendix E
APPENDIX E
TABLE OF STATUTES and CASE LAW referenced since 06/84.
ARTICLE I, Section 8, clause 3 - - COMMERCE CLAUSE
NATL. LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY 426 US 833, 49 L Ed 2d 245 (1976)
ARTICLE I, Section 8, clause 8 - - Intellectual Property
ARTICLE IV, Section 1 - - Full Faith & Credit
ARTICLE IV, Section 2 - - Privileges & Immunities
First Amendment: Speech, Assembly, Redress
i) INTERSTATE CIRCUITS v DALLAS 390 US 676, 20 L Ed 2d 225 (1968)
ii) NRLB v CONTINENTAL OIL 159 F 2d 326 (1947)
iii) HESS v INDIANA 414 US 105, 38 L Ed 2d 303 (1973)
iv) CANTWELL v CONNECTICUT N/A religion
v) HUNTLEY v PUBLIC UTL. COMM. 69 CAL Rptr. 37 (1968)
vi) GOODING v WILSON 405 US 518, 31 L Ed 2d 408 (1972) N/A
vii) F.C.C. & U.S. v RED LION BROAD. ?
viii) LARGENT v TEXAS 318 US 418, 87 L Ed 873 (1943) N/A
ix) GRAUSAM v MURPHEY (1971) N/A
x) FINK v COLE 97 NE 2d 55
xi) KEYISIAN v BOARD OF REGENTS 385 US 589, 17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967)
a) ZACCHINI v SCRIPPS-HOWARD B. 433 US 562, 53 L. Ed 2d 965 (1977)
b) CENT. HUDSON GAS v PSC of NY 447 US 557, 65 L. Ed 2d 341(1980)
c) BUSH v LUCAS 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983)
d) BUCKLEY v VALEO 424 US 1, 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976)
Fifth Amendment: Due Process & Equal Protection
i) NEBBIA v NY 291 US 502, (1933)
ii) PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. v CHEEK 259 US , 66 L Ed 1044 (1921) corps.
iii) JOHNSON v ROBISON 415 US 361, 39 L Ed 2d 389 (1974)
iv) RASULIS v WEINBERGER 502 F 2d 500
v) USD of A v MORENO 413 US 528, 37 L Ed 782 (1973)
vi) U.S. v ANTELOPE 96 S Ct. 1100 (1976)
vii) ANNOTATION: Due Process - he 5th & 14th Amendments. 47 L Ed 2d 975
a) HECKLER v MATHEWS 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984)
b) USRRB v FRITZ 449 US 166, 66 L. Ed 2d 368 (1980)
c) SCHWEIKER v WILSON 450 us 221, 67 L.Ed 2d 186 (1981)
d) APTHEKER v SEC. OF STATE 378 US 500, 12 L Ed 2d 992 (1964)
e) GREENE v McELROY 360 US 474, 3 L Ed 2d 1377 (1959)
f) ADAIR v U.S. 208 US 161, 67 L Ed 437 (1908)
Ninth Amendment: Privacy
RIGHT OF PRIVACY - - Annotation: 43 L Ed 2d 871 S. Ct. views.
Tenth Amendment: States Rights
a) NATL LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY 426 US 833, 49 L Ed 2d 245 (1976)
Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
i) YICK WO v HOPKINS 118 US 220, 225 (1886)
ii) LOUISVILLE GAS & ELECTRIC 227 US 32, 72 L Ed 770 (1928)
iii) FROST v CORP. COMMISSION OF OK 278 US 515, 522 (1929)
iv) TRUAX v CORRIGAN 257 US 312 (1921)
v) SHAPIRO v THOMPSON 394 US 618, 22 L Ed 2d 600 (1969)
vi) COMMONWEALTH v INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER N/A
vii) FREEDMAN v MARYLAND N/A
viii) BARROWS v JACKSON 346 US 429 (1953) regarding Cal. enforce.
ix) GRAYNED v ROCKFORD 408 US 104, 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972)
x) BLUMENTHAL v BOARD MED. EXAM 18 Cal Rptr. 501 const.
xi) PEOPLE (CA) v DUFFY 79 CA 2d Supp. 875; 179 p 2d 876 (1947)
xii) BYERS v BOARD OF SUPER. 262 CA 2d 148 (1968) constitutionality
Const. Amend. 14:
b) CLEMENTS v FASHING 102 S. Ct. 2836 (1982)
c) WASH. v SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. 458 US 457, 73 L. Ed 2d 896 (1982)
d) CHALMERS v CITY OF LA 762 F 2d 753 (1985)
e) MINN. v CLOVER LEAF CREAMERY 449 US 456, 66 L. Ed 2d 659 (1981)
Ninth Circuit: 14th Amendment cases
f) HOFFMAN v U.S. 767 F 2d 1431 (1985)
g) RICHARDS v SEC. OF STATE 752 F 2d 1413 (1985)
h) PARKS v WATSON 716 F 2d 646 (1983)
i) LEGAL AID SOC. OF ALA. CTY v BRENNAN 608 F 2d 1319 (1979)
j) ADAMS v HOWERTON 673 F 2d 1036 (1982)
k) HIRST v GERTZEN 676 F 2d 1252 (1982)
Trademark Act of 1946: Title 15 U.S.C. §§1051 et seq..
i) UNITED DRUG v THEO RECTANUS 248 US 90, 63 L Ed 141 (1918)
ii) AMER. STEEL FOUNDRIES v ROBERTSON 70 L Ed 317, (1925)
iii) STANDARD PAINT. v TRINIDAD ASPH. 220 US 453, 55 L Ed 536 (1910)
iv) G. & C. MERRIAM CO. v SAALFIELD 198 F. 369 (1912)
v) FURNITURE HOSP. v DORFMAN 166 SW 862 (1914)
vi) CORNING GLASS WORKS v PASMANTIER DC NY (1939)
vii) WALKER PROCESS v FOOD CORP. 382 US 172, 15 L Ed 2d 247 (1965)
viii) U.S. v US GYPSUM CO. 333 US 364, 92 L Ed 762 (1947)
ix) QUAKER STATE v STEINBERG N/A
a) VUITTON ET FILS S.A. v J. YOUNG ENT. 644 F 2d 769 (1981)
b) ROYER v STOODY CO. False publications ("Crossroads")
c) REDKEN v CLAIROL INC. (IMPOVERISH LANGUAGE OF COMMERCE)
d) ELLAY STORES v SAVITZ 30 F Supp 462 (1939)
e) Application of DEISTER 289 F 2d 496 (1961) Patent law.
f) CONFUSION OF SOURCE [treatise 1st restatements torts - chap. 35
Copyright Act of 1976: Title 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
COPYRIGHTABLE MATERIALS ¶ 505 - ¶ 2175
Entire code 17 U.S.C. 101-118
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION [Revised] entire text.
Sherman/Clayton Act - - Title 15 U.S.C. Section 1
Actions involving extraterritorial conduct: 24 Fed. Proc. L Ed §§ 54:115-122
a) U.S. v SOCONY-VACUUM OIL 310 US 150, (1939)
b) TREASURE VALLEY POTATO v ORE-IDA FOODS (1974)
c) FINCK v SCHNEIDER GRANITE 86 SW ___(1905)
d) U. S. v PARAMOUNT PICTURES 334 US 131, 92 L Ed 1260 (1947)
e) TODHUNTER-MITCHELL v ANHEUSER BUSCH 375 F Supp 610 (1974)
f) FLINTKOTE v LYSFJORD 246 F 2d 368 (1957)
Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 2
a) JERROLD ELEC. v WESCOAST BROAD. CO. 341 F 2d 653 (1965) N/A
b) U. S. v GRINNELL CORP. 384 US 563, 16 L Ed 2d 778 (1966)
c) BAUSH MACHINE v ALUM. CO. of AMER. 72 F 2d 236,240 (1934)
d) U.S. v AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. 221 US 106, 55 L Ed 2d 663 (1945)
e) U. S. v GRIFFITH 334 US 100, 92 L Ed 1236 (1947)
f) AMERICAN TOBACCO v U.S. 328 US 780, 90 L Ed 2d 1575 (1945)
g) PETO v HOWELL 101 F 2d 23 (1939)
h) UNITED SHOE MACH. CORP. v U.S. 374 US 521, 98 L Ed 910 (1953)
i) HILAND DAIRY v KROGER 402 F 2d 968 (1968)
Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 15
STARK BROS. v STARK 255 us 31, J. Holmes op. on damages under §15
CLARK OIL CO. v PHILLIPS PETRO. 148 F 2d 580 (1945)
ANTITRUST - TREBLE DAMAGEs - 16 ALR Fed. Pg. 14-69, [Lost investment]
PUNITIVE or EXEMPLARY DAMAGES RECOVERABLE, 47 ALR 2d 1118
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES - - [42 USC 1983] Regarding standards for determ. injuries. Case - PATON v LA PRADE n. 15, 524 F 2d 862 (1975)
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from n 102-114, n 185-206, 522
Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 24
U. S. v WISE 370 US 405, 8 L Ed 2d 590 (1962)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a) BUSHIE v STENOCORD No. 25536 (1972)
b) Asso. Press v U.S. 327 US 1-60 (1944)
c) MOORE v MATTHEWS No. 71-2186 (1972)
CASES INVOLVING THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
a) CHRIS BURTON v USOC No. 83-3088
b) MARTIN v I.O.C. 740 F 2d 670 (1985)
c) Stop The Olympic Prison v USOC
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Protection of Industrial Property - - Convention of 1925
TRADEMARK AND COMMERCIAL PROTECTION - - Convention of 1929
Selected International Conventions - - Important regarding litigation.
PRINCIPALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Federal Rules Decisions
a) FINANCIAL SECURITIES LIT. v PENN MART REAL. 74 FRD 497 (1975)
b) SHERMAN PARK COMM. ASSO. v WAUWATOSA 486 F Supp 838 (1980)
c) HOCKLEY v ZENT 89 FRD 26 (1980)
d) ROESBERG v JOHNS MANVILLE CORP 85 FRD 292 (1980)
e) WEINER v STUART 76 FRD 624 (1977)
TREATISES with regard to CONGRESS
LOBBYING: A Constitutionally Protected Right
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 PL 79-601
CONGRESS AND LAW MAKING, Researching the Legislative Process
By: Robert Goehlert. Clio Books
CAPITOL HILL MANUAL - - Frank Cummings
THE SUPREME COURT - - 1965 TERM - - Archibald Cox
TREATISES/TEXT BOOKS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - - AM JUR 2d, Volume 16-17, §§ 150-826
CONTROLLING TRIAL PUBLICITY - - 1 AM JUR TRIALS, 305-355
MOTION PICTURES AS EVIDENCE [Videos] - - AM JUR 8, 153-173
MONOPOLIES 54 AM JUR 2d, § 463-479, § 696-715, § 812-850
EVIDENCE - - 19 AM JUR 2d §§ 159-174, Presumptions & Inferences
OPENING STATEMENTS [Plaintiff & defendant] 5 AM JUR TRIALS, 285-329.
COMPARATOR FRCP & comparison to state rules.
DISCOVERY
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Discovery] - - Vol. 74, 940-1046 (1960)
YALE LAW REVIEW [Discovery] - - Vol. 71, (1962) 371-436
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS [Plaintiff] - - 4 AM JUR TRIALS, 186-209
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF RULE 26 [Discovery] pg. 1.211-3.108
TRADEMARK/UNFAIR COMPETITION - - treatises
TM Infringement/Unfair Competition Laws - - 8 AM JUR TRIALS, 363-482
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY REVIEWS - - 2 AM JUR 2d, § 653-711
GOVERNMENTAL *IMMUNITY OF EXEMP FROM ANTI-TRUST LAWS
12 ALR FED., 329-359.
WHITTEN v PADDOCK, [*Immunity] Columbia Law Review. Vol 71, 140-156
CALLMAN UNFAIR COMPETITION - - p. 94-105
ANTI-TRUST - TREBLE DAMAGES - 16 ALR Fed. 14-69, [Lost investment]
TABLE OF STATUTES and CASE LAW referenced since 06/84.
ARTICLE I, Section 8, clause 3 - - COMMERCE CLAUSE
NATL. LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY 426 US 833, 49 L Ed 2d 245 (1976)
ARTICLE I, Section 8, clause 8 - - Intellectual Property
ARTICLE IV, Section 1 - - Full Faith & Credit
ARTICLE IV, Section 2 - - Privileges & Immunities
First Amendment: Speech, Assembly, Redress
i) INTERSTATE CIRCUITS v DALLAS 390 US 676, 20 L Ed 2d 225 (1968)
ii) NRLB v CONTINENTAL OIL 159 F 2d 326 (1947)
iii) HESS v INDIANA 414 US 105, 38 L Ed 2d 303 (1973)
iv) CANTWELL v CONNECTICUT N/A religion
v) HUNTLEY v PUBLIC UTL. COMM. 69 CAL Rptr. 37 (1968)
vi) GOODING v WILSON 405 US 518, 31 L Ed 2d 408 (1972) N/A
vii) F.C.C. & U.S. v RED LION BROAD. ?
viii) LARGENT v TEXAS 318 US 418, 87 L Ed 873 (1943) N/A
ix) GRAUSAM v MURPHEY (1971) N/A
x) FINK v COLE 97 NE 2d 55
xi) KEYISIAN v BOARD OF REGENTS 385 US 589, 17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967)
a) ZACCHINI v SCRIPPS-HOWARD B. 433 US 562, 53 L. Ed 2d 965 (1977)
b) CENT. HUDSON GAS v PSC of NY 447 US 557, 65 L. Ed 2d 341(1980)
c) BUSH v LUCAS 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983)
d) BUCKLEY v VALEO 424 US 1, 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976)
Fifth Amendment: Due Process & Equal Protection
i) NEBBIA v NY 291 US 502, (1933)
ii) PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. v CHEEK 259 US , 66 L Ed 1044 (1921) corps.
iii) JOHNSON v ROBISON 415 US 361, 39 L Ed 2d 389 (1974)
iv) RASULIS v WEINBERGER 502 F 2d 500
v) USD of A v MORENO 413 US 528, 37 L Ed 782 (1973)
vi) U.S. v ANTELOPE 96 S Ct. 1100 (1976)
vii) ANNOTATION: Due Process - he 5th & 14th Amendments. 47 L Ed 2d 975
a) HECKLER v MATHEWS 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984)
b) USRRB v FRITZ 449 US 166, 66 L. Ed 2d 368 (1980)
c) SCHWEIKER v WILSON 450 us 221, 67 L.Ed 2d 186 (1981)
d) APTHEKER v SEC. OF STATE 378 US 500, 12 L Ed 2d 992 (1964)
e) GREENE v McELROY 360 US 474, 3 L Ed 2d 1377 (1959)
f) ADAIR v U.S. 208 US 161, 67 L Ed 437 (1908)
Ninth Amendment: Privacy
RIGHT OF PRIVACY - - Annotation: 43 L Ed 2d 871 S. Ct. views.
Tenth Amendment: States Rights
a) NATL LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY 426 US 833, 49 L Ed 2d 245 (1976)
Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
i) YICK WO v HOPKINS 118 US 220, 225 (1886)
ii) LOUISVILLE GAS & ELECTRIC 227 US 32, 72 L Ed 770 (1928)
iii) FROST v CORP. COMMISSION OF OK 278 US 515, 522 (1929)
iv) TRUAX v CORRIGAN 257 US 312 (1921)
v) SHAPIRO v THOMPSON 394 US 618, 22 L Ed 2d 600 (1969)
vi) COMMONWEALTH v INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER N/A
vii) FREEDMAN v MARYLAND N/A
viii) BARROWS v JACKSON 346 US 429 (1953) regarding Cal. enforce.
ix) GRAYNED v ROCKFORD 408 US 104, 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972)
x) BLUMENTHAL v BOARD MED. EXAM 18 Cal Rptr. 501 const.
xi) PEOPLE (CA) v DUFFY 79 CA 2d Supp. 875; 179 p 2d 876 (1947)
xii) BYERS v BOARD OF SUPER. 262 CA 2d 148 (1968) constitutionality
Const. Amend. 14:
b) CLEMENTS v FASHING 102 S. Ct. 2836 (1982)
c) WASH. v SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. 458 US 457, 73 L. Ed 2d 896 (1982)
d) CHALMERS v CITY OF LA 762 F 2d 753 (1985)
e) MINN. v CLOVER LEAF CREAMERY 449 US 456, 66 L. Ed 2d 659 (1981)
Ninth Circuit: 14th Amendment cases
f) HOFFMAN v U.S. 767 F 2d 1431 (1985)
g) RICHARDS v SEC. OF STATE 752 F 2d 1413 (1985)
h) PARKS v WATSON 716 F 2d 646 (1983)
i) LEGAL AID SOC. OF ALA. CTY v BRENNAN 608 F 2d 1319 (1979)
j) ADAMS v HOWERTON 673 F 2d 1036 (1982)
k) HIRST v GERTZEN 676 F 2d 1252 (1982)
Trademark Act of 1946: Title 15 U.S.C. §§1051 et seq..
i) UNITED DRUG v THEO RECTANUS 248 US 90, 63 L Ed 141 (1918)
ii) AMER. STEEL FOUNDRIES v ROBERTSON 70 L Ed 317, (1925)
iii) STANDARD PAINT. v TRINIDAD ASPH. 220 US 453, 55 L Ed 536 (1910)
iv) G. & C. MERRIAM CO. v SAALFIELD 198 F. 369 (1912)
v) FURNITURE HOSP. v DORFMAN 166 SW 862 (1914)
vi) CORNING GLASS WORKS v PASMANTIER DC NY (1939)
vii) WALKER PROCESS v FOOD CORP. 382 US 172, 15 L Ed 2d 247 (1965)
viii) U.S. v US GYPSUM CO. 333 US 364, 92 L Ed 762 (1947)
ix) QUAKER STATE v STEINBERG N/A
a) VUITTON ET FILS S.A. v J. YOUNG ENT. 644 F 2d 769 (1981)
b) ROYER v STOODY CO. False publications ("Crossroads")
c) REDKEN v CLAIROL INC. (IMPOVERISH LANGUAGE OF COMMERCE)
d) ELLAY STORES v SAVITZ 30 F Supp 462 (1939)
e) Application of DEISTER 289 F 2d 496 (1961) Patent law.
f) CONFUSION OF SOURCE [treatise 1st restatements torts - chap. 35
Copyright Act of 1976: Title 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
COPYRIGHTABLE MATERIALS ¶ 505 - ¶ 2175
Entire code 17 U.S.C. 101-118
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION [Revised] entire text.
Sherman/Clayton Act - - Title 15 U.S.C. Section 1
Actions involving extraterritorial conduct: 24 Fed. Proc. L Ed §§ 54:115-122
a) U.S. v SOCONY-VACUUM OIL 310 US 150, (1939)
b) TREASURE VALLEY POTATO v ORE-IDA FOODS (1974)
c) FINCK v SCHNEIDER GRANITE 86 SW ___(1905)
d) U. S. v PARAMOUNT PICTURES 334 US 131, 92 L Ed 1260 (1947)
e) TODHUNTER-MITCHELL v ANHEUSER BUSCH 375 F Supp 610 (1974)
f) FLINTKOTE v LYSFJORD 246 F 2d 368 (1957)
Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 2
a) JERROLD ELEC. v WESCOAST BROAD. CO. 341 F 2d 653 (1965) N/A
b) U. S. v GRINNELL CORP. 384 US 563, 16 L Ed 2d 778 (1966)
c) BAUSH MACHINE v ALUM. CO. of AMER. 72 F 2d 236,240 (1934)
d) U.S. v AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. 221 US 106, 55 L Ed 2d 663 (1945)
e) U. S. v GRIFFITH 334 US 100, 92 L Ed 1236 (1947)
f) AMERICAN TOBACCO v U.S. 328 US 780, 90 L Ed 2d 1575 (1945)
g) PETO v HOWELL 101 F 2d 23 (1939)
h) UNITED SHOE MACH. CORP. v U.S. 374 US 521, 98 L Ed 910 (1953)
i) HILAND DAIRY v KROGER 402 F 2d 968 (1968)
Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 15
STARK BROS. v STARK 255 us 31, J. Holmes op. on damages under §15
CLARK OIL CO. v PHILLIPS PETRO. 148 F 2d 580 (1945)
ANTITRUST - TREBLE DAMAGEs - 16 ALR Fed. Pg. 14-69, [Lost investment]
PUNITIVE or EXEMPLARY DAMAGES RECOVERABLE, 47 ALR 2d 1118
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES - - [42 USC 1983] Regarding standards for determ. injuries. Case - PATON v LA PRADE n. 15, 524 F 2d 862 (1975)
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from n 102-114, n 185-206, 522
Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 24
U. S. v WISE 370 US 405, 8 L Ed 2d 590 (1962)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a) BUSHIE v STENOCORD No. 25536 (1972)
b) Asso. Press v U.S. 327 US 1-60 (1944)
c) MOORE v MATTHEWS No. 71-2186 (1972)
CASES INVOLVING THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
a) CHRIS BURTON v USOC No. 83-3088
b) MARTIN v I.O.C. 740 F 2d 670 (1985)
c) Stop The Olympic Prison v USOC
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Protection of Industrial Property - - Convention of 1925
TRADEMARK AND COMMERCIAL PROTECTION - - Convention of 1929
Selected International Conventions - - Important regarding litigation.
PRINCIPALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Federal Rules Decisions
a) FINANCIAL SECURITIES LIT. v PENN MART REAL. 74 FRD 497 (1975)
b) SHERMAN PARK COMM. ASSO. v WAUWATOSA 486 F Supp 838 (1980)
c) HOCKLEY v ZENT 89 FRD 26 (1980)
d) ROESBERG v JOHNS MANVILLE CORP 85 FRD 292 (1980)
e) WEINER v STUART 76 FRD 624 (1977)
TREATISES with regard to CONGRESS
LOBBYING: A Constitutionally Protected Right
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 PL 79-601
CONGRESS AND LAW MAKING, Researching the Legislative Process
By: Robert Goehlert. Clio Books
CAPITOL HILL MANUAL - - Frank Cummings
THE SUPREME COURT - - 1965 TERM - - Archibald Cox
TREATISES/TEXT BOOKS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - - AM JUR 2d, Volume 16-17, §§ 150-826
CONTROLLING TRIAL PUBLICITY - - 1 AM JUR TRIALS, 305-355
MOTION PICTURES AS EVIDENCE [Videos] - - AM JUR 8, 153-173
MONOPOLIES 54 AM JUR 2d, § 463-479, § 696-715, § 812-850
EVIDENCE - - 19 AM JUR 2d §§ 159-174, Presumptions & Inferences
OPENING STATEMENTS [Plaintiff & defendant] 5 AM JUR TRIALS, 285-329.
COMPARATOR FRCP & comparison to state rules.
DISCOVERY
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Discovery] - - Vol. 74, 940-1046 (1960)
YALE LAW REVIEW [Discovery] - - Vol. 71, (1962) 371-436
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS [Plaintiff] - - 4 AM JUR TRIALS, 186-209
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF RULE 26 [Discovery] pg. 1.211-3.108
TRADEMARK/UNFAIR COMPETITION - - treatises
TM Infringement/Unfair Competition Laws - - 8 AM JUR TRIALS, 363-482
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY REVIEWS - - 2 AM JUR 2d, § 653-711
GOVERNMENTAL *IMMUNITY OF EXEMP FROM ANTI-TRUST LAWS
12 ALR FED., 329-359.
WHITTEN v PADDOCK, [*Immunity] Columbia Law Review. Vol 71, 140-156
CALLMAN UNFAIR COMPETITION - - p. 94-105
ANTI-TRUST - TREBLE DAMAGES - 16 ALR Fed. 14-69, [Lost investment]
The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix D
APPENDIX D
LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Jurisdiction:
This action arises under the Constitution of the United States: Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article IV, Section 1 and 2; the First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment; 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq.; and upon jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1138(b), and 15 U.S.C. Section 2 and 15.
Cause of Action:
They threatened to sue any users of Olympic which included me and also stopped me from getting a federal registered trademark for my company name and corporation. I took an affirmative position and sued them.
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OFFENSES
I. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Non-enforcement/selective enforcement
II. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Right to Contract
III. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Pursue Chosen Profession
IV. First Amendment: Freedom from Prior Restraint.
V. 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amends. Over breadth of Legislation
VI. Article IV, §1. Full Faith and Credit Denied
VII. Article IV, §2. Property rights in Stock, and trademark.
VIII. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
IX. Fourteenth Amendment: Privileges and Immunities
X. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Denial of valid Copyrights
XI. Tenth Amendment: Persons and States rights.
XII. Ninth Amendment: Privacy and Reputation
XIII. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Illegal Trademark registration
XIV. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Unfair Use of Trademark
XV. 15 U.S.C. §2, Sherman Act. Attempted Monopoly
XVI. Article I, §8, clause 3. Attempt to Regulate Int. Commerce.
XVII. 15 U.S.C. §15, Clayton Act Interference with right to trade or exist
Cases Argued and Cited
Fourteenth Amendment: Selective enforcement
Yick Wo v Hopkins, (1886) 118 US 356, 359; 30 L Ed 220, 227; 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070 the court stated,"If a law is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons of similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal protection is within the prohibitions of the Constitution. Louisville Gas & Electric v Coleman, (1928) 277 US 32, 37; 48 S. CT. 423, the Court said, "The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means that rights of all persons must rest on the same rule under similar circumstances, and applies to the exercise of all the powers of the state which can affect the individual or his property." Distinguished in Frost v Corp. Comm. of OK, (1929) 278 US 515, 522; 49 S. Ct. 235. In Frost, the Court stated that it has "several times decided that a corporation is as much entitled to the equal protection of laws as an individual. The converse is equally true. A classification which is bad because it arbitrarily favors the individual as against the corporation certainly cannot be good when it favors the corporation as against the individual. In either case, the classification, in order to be valid, must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all person similarly situated shall be treated alike."
The state of California acted upon the USOC's instructions to selectively enforce section 380 against their citizens, including this citizen, even when defendant cannot gain this enforcement assistance and support for section 380 in any other leading commercial state in the country nor in Colorado, the state of incorporation of the defendant.
In Shelly v Kraemer, (1948) 334 US 1; 22 S. Ct. 836, the Court stated, "The Constitution confers upon no individual person the right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of he laws to other individuals.
The defendant USOC has no right or authority to request the state of California, or any other state or agency to deny equal protection of the law to the plaintiff or any other similarly situated person.
Fifth Amendment: Selective enforcement and Due Process
In Johnson v Robison, (1974) 415 US 316, 365; 94 S. Ct. 1160, the Court said, "If a classification would be valid under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." In USDA v Moreno, (1973) 413 US 528; 93 S Ct. 2821, the Court stated, "Under the equal protection analysis a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."
There can be no rational basis for the distinction drawn between natural and artificial persons in California nor any rational basis for the distinction drawn between California businesses and businesses using olympic in 46 other states.
First Amendment: Prior Restraint
In Freedman v Maryland, (1965) 380 US 51, 57; 85 S. CT. 734 It was stated by the Court, "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
36 U.SC. §380 provides that the defendant has licensing control over use of the word olympic. There will have to be reasonable and definite standard by which the defendant could "rent" the word olympic without the accompanying olympic designations. There can be no reasonable and definite standard made out as to "rent" the word olympic, nor can the word be diluted as the defendant suggests because there must be exclusivity in order for there to be dilution and there is no exclusivity. Vagueness in the system of licensing is established by his "lack of reasonable and definite standard" to use olympic as a guide for renting the word olympic.
In Interstate Circuit v Dallas, (1968) 390 US 676; 88 S. Ct. 12 the Court concluded that "the absence narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for officials to follow [in licensing] is fatal. In Huntley v Public Utilities Commission, (1968) 442 P 2d 685, 688, the California Supreme Court sitting en banc stated, " Improper restraints on communication may vary in form and degree, but all have effect of restricting the dissemination of ideas. The clearest abuse is an "outright prohibition" of a constitutionally protected form of speech. Regulation short of "absolute prohibition" is also invalid when expression is made dependent on state approval by the obtaining of a permit, or is conditioned upon obtaining approval of a board of censors."
The USOC states that permission must be granted to use olympic but it remains to be discovered whether the defendant has ever rented the word to anyone without an accompanying olympic designation. It also remains to be discovered what reasonable and definite standard the defendant uses to determine who can and who cannot use olympic, how much it would cost, restrictions and limitations upon its use, duration of use, as well as other considerations, separate from an olympic trademarked designation.
"No one has the constitutional right to interfere with, restrain or coerce another in the exercise of the same right . . ." NRLB v Continental Oil, distinguishing NRLB v Link Belt Co., (1940) 311 US 584, 598; 61 S. Ct. 358.
The plaintiff claims the right to use olympic under the First Amendment provision which provides that persons are to be free from a prior restraint on the use of a spoken word.
Delegation of Licensing Power to a Private Corporation
"In our view the delegation by the Legislature (NY) of its licensing power to the Jockey Club, a private corporation, is such an abdication as to be patently an unconstitutional relinquishment of legislative power in violation of section 1 of Article III of the constitution of this state (NY) which provides: The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and the Assembly." Fink v Cole, (1951) 97 NE 2d 873, 876; 302 NY 216.
This is analogous to the provisions of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution in that Congress may not delegate powers to any person which in effect, or in fact, create the illusion of Federally granted power to license [olympic] over the entire field of commercial enterprise or endeavor. The legislative history of 36 U.S.C. § 371 et seq. bears a recital. These games have 'only' to do with amateur athletics. The defendant assumes the position as proprietor of the word olympic over the entire filed of commercial endeavor. This is grossly incompatible with the legislative history as defined by Senate Report No. 2523 regarding the Amateur Act.
COMMERCE CLAUSE - Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
"Activities that are beyond the reach of Congress under the commerce power are those which are completely within the particular state, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some general powers of government." Katzenback v McClung, 379 US 294; 85 S. Ct. 377.
"Authority of Federal government over interstate commerce may not be pushed to such extremes as to destroy the distinction between commerce among the several states and internal concerns of [the] state." NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel, (1937) 301 US 1; 57 S. Ct. 615.
The statue under attack makes no distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce, and it may well be true that most olympic businesses throughout the U.S. may be small, locally owned, intrastate businesses. Congress has no grant of power over the states in regard to purely intrastate business unless it substantially effects interstate commerce.
Right of Olympic Records, Inc. to Interstate Commerce
"The state cannot exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce . . ." Horn Silver Mining v New York, (1892) 143 US 305; 12 S. Ct. 403. "A corporation from one state may go into another without leave of license of the latter for all legitimate purposes of interstate commerce, and any statute of the latter state which obstructs or lays burden on the exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution." Western Union v Kansas, (1910) 216 US 1; 30 S. Ct. 190. Pullman Co. v Kansas, (1910) 216 US 56; 30 S. Ct. 232. "Right to engage in interstate commerce is not a gift of the state and it cannot be restrained or regulated by the state, nor cab the state exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in such commerce." "It follows that under the commerce clause [a] corporation authorized by the state of its creation to engage in interstate commerce may not be prevented by another state from coming into its limits for all legitimate purposes of such commerce . . ." Sioux Remedy v Cope, (1914) 235 US 197; 35 S. Ct. 57.
"State has authority to control doing business within the state by foreign corporations but it is without power to use its lawful authority to exclude foreign corporations by directly burdening interstate commerce, as a condition of permitting them to do business within the state, in violation of he Federal Constitution." Looney v Crane Co, (1917) 245 US 178; 38 S. Ct. 85.
The state of California burdens interstate commerce by refusing Olympic Records, Inc. the right and ability to do business in the state.
Invalid Trademark Registration No. 968,566
In the case of G. & C. Merriam v Saalfield, (1912) 198 F 369 a Public Right doctrine was stated by the court, "Primarily, it would seem that one might appropriate to himself for his goods any words or phrase that he chose; but this is not so, because the broader Public Right prevails, and one may not appropriate to his own exclusive use a word which already belongs to the Public and so may be used by any one of the Public."
In Delaware Canal v Clark, (1871) 13 Wall. 311, 323; 20 L Ed 581, 583, the court held, "No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade name or trademark which would give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other than those produced by himself. If he could the Public would be injured, for competition would be destroyed." Distinguished in Standard Paint v Trinidad Asphalt, (1911) 220 US 446, 453; 36 S. Ct. 456. Also stated in Delaware, "There is no moral or legal wrong in the adoption or imitation of what is claimed by another as a trademark if it is just as true in it's application to the goods of the second adopter as to those of the first."
In United Drug v Theodore Rectanus, (1918) 248 US 90, 98; 39 S. Ct. 90, the Court held, "The owner of a trademark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly." Distinguished in American Steel v Robertson, (1925) 269 US 372, 380; 70 L Ed 317, 320, in American the Court further stated, "The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does not prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on articles of different description."
"No damages shall be recovered by a party failing to give notice of registration exception proof that the plaintiff or defendant was duly notified of the infringement and continued the same after notice." Stark Bros. v Stark (1920) 255 US 50; 41 S. Ct. 221. 15 USC §1111 provides the same authority as Stark. The defendant was precluded from using the notice provision provided for by 15 USC §1111.
DISCRIMINATORY USE OF TRADEMARK - Registration no. 980, 734
This trademark was used by the defendant on a letter sent to all the 50 States during 1978 requesting the selective enforcement of section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act. [Exh. 231] Regarding the plaintiff's torch: In Corning v Pasmantier, 30 Supp 477,480 (1939), the court made a visual comparison of the torch trademarks and found the question of infringement rested on a visual comparison of the marks.
The plaintiff has no registration for a torch though one is pending. The defendant has a torch in registration no. 980,734 but this torch is not mentioned or described in any way, thus neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have a registration for a torch and a visual comparison of the torches is a good test for infringement. Plaintiff used a pre-existing torch as a model from which his torch was derived. The model was not the olympic torch.
ATTEMPTED MONOPOLY - Sherman Act §2
"A monopoly in the United States created by contract or agreement with foreign corporations is unlawful." U.S. v American Tobacco, (1911) 221 US 106; 31 S. Ct. 632. distinguished in Bausch Machine v Aluminum Co., (2nd Circuit, 1934).
In Peto v Howell 101 F 2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1938), a classic explanation of a monopoly was states by the court, Monopoly is the acquisition of something for one's own self, not necessarily the whole of a given commodity or the whole commerce therein but control, at least, of a part thereof sufficient to constitute withholding from the public the right to deal therein in an open market." The source for this authority lies in U.S. v Keystone Watch, (D.C. PA 1915; 218 F 502. This court distinguishing Standard Oil v U.S., 221 U.S. 1; 31 S. Ct. 502, 516, stated, "Congress, in speaking of monopolies of any part of interstate commerce, must have had in mind such restraints of such part of that commerce as bring about an extraordinary control of any part of the commodities in the stream of commerce . . . the court added, The words 'to monopolize,' and 'monopolize' as used in this section [§2] reach every act bringing about the prohibited results."
"It is not of importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful . . . American Tobacco v U.S. (1945) 328 U.S. 781, 809; 66 S. Ct. 1125.
In U.S v Griffith (1948) 334 US 100, 105; 68 S. Ct. 941, the Court stated, "It is, however, not always necessary to find specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the antitrust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that the restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequences of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements." Id. L Ed at 1243, "So it is that monopoly power,whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under section 2 . . . for section 2 of the Act is aimed at the acquisition or retention of effective market control." The court continued, "Hence the existence of power 'to exclude competition when it is desired to do so' is in itself a violation of section 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power." See, American Tobacco v U.S., SUPRA. The antitrust laws are as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction."
In U.S. v Grinnel Corp., (1966) 384 US 563, 570, 571; 86 S. Ct 1698, the Court said, "The offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power . . . Id. at L Ed 2d 787, "we [the Court] see no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where that combination reflects commercial realities."
In regard to (1) defendant's control over commerce in the United states, pursuant to section 380, indicates that the relevant market [of the defendant] as being the entire field commercial products and services and (2) here is no question as to the willful maintenance of the power of section 380.
In Hiland Dairy v Kroger (8th Cir. 1968) 402 F 2d 968, 971, the court stated, "Under the section 2 [Sherman Act] the attempt to monopolize must be 'likely to accomplish' monopolization, Kansas City Star v U.S., 240 F 2D 643, 663 (8th Cir. 1957), or afford a 'dangerous probability of monopolization." Also stated, "The specific intent necessary to support an attempted monopolization under section 2 must be shown by the conduct or acts from which a wrongful intent can be inferred."
DAMAGES UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 15
In Clark Oil v Phillips Petro, 148 F2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945), the court stated its explanation of damages under the antitrust statutes. "The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act afford a cause of action for those suffering damages. In their provisions for damages hey embody both punitive and compensatory damages but no recovery can be had unless a case for compensatory damages is made. In the event of compensatory damages, the automatically punitive damages follow." In Clark, supra F 2d at 583, "[A]n action to recover treble damages under the Clayton Act is based upon tort and is not fixed by statutory provisions, but the damages are unliquidated."
15 U.S.C. § 24
The purpose and intent of 15 U.S.C. § 24 was analyzed in the case of U.S v Wise, (1962) 370 US 405, 413, 414; 82 S. Ct. 1354, in which the Court discussed its analysis regarding eh definition f he word "persons" as used in the antitrust laws not meant to exclude corporate officers and directors by stating, "The reasons for section 14 [Clayton Act] are sufficiently revealed by the legislative history . . . The reports provide no assistance but the debates do . ."[§14] is merely a reenactment of the Sherman law, sections 1, 2, and 3. It has always been held that the officers of corporations violating the law wee punishable under these sections."
The plaintiff holds that the 'artificial person' of the defendant [Federally Chartered Corporation] is only capable of injuring another person through a natural person, e.g., an officer, director, or authorized agent.
THE LANHAM ACT APPLIES TO 36 U.S.C. §371 et. seq.
In the amending of 36 U.S.C. § 371 et. seq. (1950) into the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, a provision was added to apply the rights and remedies available under the Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act] to all existing rights and privileges encompassed in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. In the defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p.8 line 11, "As regards is constitutionality, section 380 presents no different issue that traditional trademarks and the right to exclusive use of the words comprising the mark that trademark law grants to the holder."
In the treatise on trademarks by Dubroff & Seidel, Trademark Law and Practice, §1:06 declaring the general principals regarding trademarks, "It must be of such a nature as to permit exclusive appropriation by one person . . . [U]nless the trademark performs its proper function, neither can the first adopter be injured by appropriation or imitation of it [TM] by others, nor can the public be deceived."
Olympic has not been exclusively appropriated by the defendant, whether rights exist to that effect, or not. It is important to note that olympic cannot be appropriated by any person, not even the defendant, and at this time the only way to exclusively appropriate olympic wold be to take it away from all other persons who have various rights and titles thereto, an impossible accomplishment.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that judgment be had against the defendant as demanded in his First Amended Complaint.
LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Jurisdiction:
This action arises under the Constitution of the United States: Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article IV, Section 1 and 2; the First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment; 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq.; and upon jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1138(b), and 15 U.S.C. Section 2 and 15.
Cause of Action:
They threatened to sue any users of Olympic which included me and also stopped me from getting a federal registered trademark for my company name and corporation. I took an affirmative position and sued them.
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OFFENSES
I. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Non-enforcement/selective enforcement
II. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Right to Contract
III. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Pursue Chosen Profession
IV. First Amendment: Freedom from Prior Restraint.
V. 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amends. Over breadth of Legislation
VI. Article IV, §1. Full Faith and Credit Denied
VII. Article IV, §2. Property rights in Stock, and trademark.
VIII. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
IX. Fourteenth Amendment: Privileges and Immunities
X. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Denial of valid Copyrights
XI. Tenth Amendment: Persons and States rights.
XII. Ninth Amendment: Privacy and Reputation
XIII. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Illegal Trademark registration
XIV. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Unfair Use of Trademark
XV. 15 U.S.C. §2, Sherman Act. Attempted Monopoly
XVI. Article I, §8, clause 3. Attempt to Regulate Int. Commerce.
XVII. 15 U.S.C. §15, Clayton Act Interference with right to trade or exist
Cases Argued and Cited
Fourteenth Amendment: Selective enforcement
Yick Wo v Hopkins, (1886) 118 US 356, 359; 30 L Ed 220, 227; 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070 the court stated,"If a law is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons of similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal protection is within the prohibitions of the Constitution. Louisville Gas & Electric v Coleman, (1928) 277 US 32, 37; 48 S. CT. 423, the Court said, "The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means that rights of all persons must rest on the same rule under similar circumstances, and applies to the exercise of all the powers of the state which can affect the individual or his property." Distinguished in Frost v Corp. Comm. of OK, (1929) 278 US 515, 522; 49 S. Ct. 235. In Frost, the Court stated that it has "several times decided that a corporation is as much entitled to the equal protection of laws as an individual. The converse is equally true. A classification which is bad because it arbitrarily favors the individual as against the corporation certainly cannot be good when it favors the corporation as against the individual. In either case, the classification, in order to be valid, must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all person similarly situated shall be treated alike."
The state of California acted upon the USOC's instructions to selectively enforce section 380 against their citizens, including this citizen, even when defendant cannot gain this enforcement assistance and support for section 380 in any other leading commercial state in the country nor in Colorado, the state of incorporation of the defendant.
In Shelly v Kraemer, (1948) 334 US 1; 22 S. Ct. 836, the Court stated, "The Constitution confers upon no individual person the right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of he laws to other individuals.
The defendant USOC has no right or authority to request the state of California, or any other state or agency to deny equal protection of the law to the plaintiff or any other similarly situated person.
Fifth Amendment: Selective enforcement and Due Process
In Johnson v Robison, (1974) 415 US 316, 365; 94 S. Ct. 1160, the Court said, "If a classification would be valid under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." In USDA v Moreno, (1973) 413 US 528; 93 S Ct. 2821, the Court stated, "Under the equal protection analysis a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."
There can be no rational basis for the distinction drawn between natural and artificial persons in California nor any rational basis for the distinction drawn between California businesses and businesses using olympic in 46 other states.
First Amendment: Prior Restraint
In Freedman v Maryland, (1965) 380 US 51, 57; 85 S. CT. 734 It was stated by the Court, "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
36 U.SC. §380 provides that the defendant has licensing control over use of the word olympic. There will have to be reasonable and definite standard by which the defendant could "rent" the word olympic without the accompanying olympic designations. There can be no reasonable and definite standard made out as to "rent" the word olympic, nor can the word be diluted as the defendant suggests because there must be exclusivity in order for there to be dilution and there is no exclusivity. Vagueness in the system of licensing is established by his "lack of reasonable and definite standard" to use olympic as a guide for renting the word olympic.
In Interstate Circuit v Dallas, (1968) 390 US 676; 88 S. Ct. 12 the Court concluded that "the absence narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for officials to follow [in licensing] is fatal. In Huntley v Public Utilities Commission, (1968) 442 P 2d 685, 688, the California Supreme Court sitting en banc stated, " Improper restraints on communication may vary in form and degree, but all have effect of restricting the dissemination of ideas. The clearest abuse is an "outright prohibition" of a constitutionally protected form of speech. Regulation short of "absolute prohibition" is also invalid when expression is made dependent on state approval by the obtaining of a permit, or is conditioned upon obtaining approval of a board of censors."
The USOC states that permission must be granted to use olympic but it remains to be discovered whether the defendant has ever rented the word to anyone without an accompanying olympic designation. It also remains to be discovered what reasonable and definite standard the defendant uses to determine who can and who cannot use olympic, how much it would cost, restrictions and limitations upon its use, duration of use, as well as other considerations, separate from an olympic trademarked designation.
"No one has the constitutional right to interfere with, restrain or coerce another in the exercise of the same right . . ." NRLB v Continental Oil, distinguishing NRLB v Link Belt Co., (1940) 311 US 584, 598; 61 S. Ct. 358.
The plaintiff claims the right to use olympic under the First Amendment provision which provides that persons are to be free from a prior restraint on the use of a spoken word.
Delegation of Licensing Power to a Private Corporation
"In our view the delegation by the Legislature (NY) of its licensing power to the Jockey Club, a private corporation, is such an abdication as to be patently an unconstitutional relinquishment of legislative power in violation of section 1 of Article III of the constitution of this state (NY) which provides: The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and the Assembly." Fink v Cole, (1951) 97 NE 2d 873, 876; 302 NY 216.
This is analogous to the provisions of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution in that Congress may not delegate powers to any person which in effect, or in fact, create the illusion of Federally granted power to license [olympic] over the entire field of commercial enterprise or endeavor. The legislative history of 36 U.S.C. § 371 et seq. bears a recital. These games have 'only' to do with amateur athletics. The defendant assumes the position as proprietor of the word olympic over the entire filed of commercial endeavor. This is grossly incompatible with the legislative history as defined by Senate Report No. 2523 regarding the Amateur Act.
COMMERCE CLAUSE - Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
"Activities that are beyond the reach of Congress under the commerce power are those which are completely within the particular state, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some general powers of government." Katzenback v McClung, 379 US 294; 85 S. Ct. 377.
"Authority of Federal government over interstate commerce may not be pushed to such extremes as to destroy the distinction between commerce among the several states and internal concerns of [the] state." NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel, (1937) 301 US 1; 57 S. Ct. 615.
The statue under attack makes no distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce, and it may well be true that most olympic businesses throughout the U.S. may be small, locally owned, intrastate businesses. Congress has no grant of power over the states in regard to purely intrastate business unless it substantially effects interstate commerce.
Right of Olympic Records, Inc. to Interstate Commerce
"The state cannot exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce . . ." Horn Silver Mining v New York, (1892) 143 US 305; 12 S. Ct. 403. "A corporation from one state may go into another without leave of license of the latter for all legitimate purposes of interstate commerce, and any statute of the latter state which obstructs or lays burden on the exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution." Western Union v Kansas, (1910) 216 US 1; 30 S. Ct. 190. Pullman Co. v Kansas, (1910) 216 US 56; 30 S. Ct. 232. "Right to engage in interstate commerce is not a gift of the state and it cannot be restrained or regulated by the state, nor cab the state exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in such commerce." "It follows that under the commerce clause [a] corporation authorized by the state of its creation to engage in interstate commerce may not be prevented by another state from coming into its limits for all legitimate purposes of such commerce . . ." Sioux Remedy v Cope, (1914) 235 US 197; 35 S. Ct. 57.
"State has authority to control doing business within the state by foreign corporations but it is without power to use its lawful authority to exclude foreign corporations by directly burdening interstate commerce, as a condition of permitting them to do business within the state, in violation of he Federal Constitution." Looney v Crane Co, (1917) 245 US 178; 38 S. Ct. 85.
The state of California burdens interstate commerce by refusing Olympic Records, Inc. the right and ability to do business in the state.
Invalid Trademark Registration No. 968,566
In the case of G. & C. Merriam v Saalfield, (1912) 198 F 369 a Public Right doctrine was stated by the court, "Primarily, it would seem that one might appropriate to himself for his goods any words or phrase that he chose; but this is not so, because the broader Public Right prevails, and one may not appropriate to his own exclusive use a word which already belongs to the Public and so may be used by any one of the Public."
In Delaware Canal v Clark, (1871) 13 Wall. 311, 323; 20 L Ed 581, 583, the court held, "No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade name or trademark which would give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other than those produced by himself. If he could the Public would be injured, for competition would be destroyed." Distinguished in Standard Paint v Trinidad Asphalt, (1911) 220 US 446, 453; 36 S. Ct. 456. Also stated in Delaware, "There is no moral or legal wrong in the adoption or imitation of what is claimed by another as a trademark if it is just as true in it's application to the goods of the second adopter as to those of the first."
In United Drug v Theodore Rectanus, (1918) 248 US 90, 98; 39 S. Ct. 90, the Court held, "The owner of a trademark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly." Distinguished in American Steel v Robertson, (1925) 269 US 372, 380; 70 L Ed 317, 320, in American the Court further stated, "The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does not prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on articles of different description."
"No damages shall be recovered by a party failing to give notice of registration exception proof that the plaintiff or defendant was duly notified of the infringement and continued the same after notice." Stark Bros. v Stark (1920) 255 US 50; 41 S. Ct. 221. 15 USC §1111 provides the same authority as Stark. The defendant was precluded from using the notice provision provided for by 15 USC §1111.
DISCRIMINATORY USE OF TRADEMARK - Registration no. 980, 734
This trademark was used by the defendant on a letter sent to all the 50 States during 1978 requesting the selective enforcement of section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act. [Exh. 231] Regarding the plaintiff's torch: In Corning v Pasmantier, 30 Supp 477,480 (1939), the court made a visual comparison of the torch trademarks and found the question of infringement rested on a visual comparison of the marks.
The plaintiff has no registration for a torch though one is pending. The defendant has a torch in registration no. 980,734 but this torch is not mentioned or described in any way, thus neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have a registration for a torch and a visual comparison of the torches is a good test for infringement. Plaintiff used a pre-existing torch as a model from which his torch was derived. The model was not the olympic torch.
ATTEMPTED MONOPOLY - Sherman Act §2
"A monopoly in the United States created by contract or agreement with foreign corporations is unlawful." U.S. v American Tobacco, (1911) 221 US 106; 31 S. Ct. 632. distinguished in Bausch Machine v Aluminum Co., (2nd Circuit, 1934).
In Peto v Howell 101 F 2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1938), a classic explanation of a monopoly was states by the court, Monopoly is the acquisition of something for one's own self, not necessarily the whole of a given commodity or the whole commerce therein but control, at least, of a part thereof sufficient to constitute withholding from the public the right to deal therein in an open market." The source for this authority lies in U.S. v Keystone Watch, (D.C. PA 1915; 218 F 502. This court distinguishing Standard Oil v U.S., 221 U.S. 1; 31 S. Ct. 502, 516, stated, "Congress, in speaking of monopolies of any part of interstate commerce, must have had in mind such restraints of such part of that commerce as bring about an extraordinary control of any part of the commodities in the stream of commerce . . . the court added, The words 'to monopolize,' and 'monopolize' as used in this section [§2] reach every act bringing about the prohibited results."
"It is not of importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful . . . American Tobacco v U.S. (1945) 328 U.S. 781, 809; 66 S. Ct. 1125.
In U.S v Griffith (1948) 334 US 100, 105; 68 S. Ct. 941, the Court stated, "It is, however, not always necessary to find specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the antitrust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that the restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequences of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements." Id. L Ed at 1243, "So it is that monopoly power,whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under section 2 . . . for section 2 of the Act is aimed at the acquisition or retention of effective market control." The court continued, "Hence the existence of power 'to exclude competition when it is desired to do so' is in itself a violation of section 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power." See, American Tobacco v U.S., SUPRA. The antitrust laws are as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction."
In U.S. v Grinnel Corp., (1966) 384 US 563, 570, 571; 86 S. Ct 1698, the Court said, "The offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power . . . Id. at L Ed 2d 787, "we [the Court] see no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where that combination reflects commercial realities."
In regard to (1) defendant's control over commerce in the United states, pursuant to section 380, indicates that the relevant market [of the defendant] as being the entire field commercial products and services and (2) here is no question as to the willful maintenance of the power of section 380.
In Hiland Dairy v Kroger (8th Cir. 1968) 402 F 2d 968, 971, the court stated, "Under the section 2 [Sherman Act] the attempt to monopolize must be 'likely to accomplish' monopolization, Kansas City Star v U.S., 240 F 2D 643, 663 (8th Cir. 1957), or afford a 'dangerous probability of monopolization." Also stated, "The specific intent necessary to support an attempted monopolization under section 2 must be shown by the conduct or acts from which a wrongful intent can be inferred."
DAMAGES UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 15
In Clark Oil v Phillips Petro, 148 F2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945), the court stated its explanation of damages under the antitrust statutes. "The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act afford a cause of action for those suffering damages. In their provisions for damages hey embody both punitive and compensatory damages but no recovery can be had unless a case for compensatory damages is made. In the event of compensatory damages, the automatically punitive damages follow." In Clark, supra F 2d at 583, "[A]n action to recover treble damages under the Clayton Act is based upon tort and is not fixed by statutory provisions, but the damages are unliquidated."
15 U.S.C. § 24
The purpose and intent of 15 U.S.C. § 24 was analyzed in the case of U.S v Wise, (1962) 370 US 405, 413, 414; 82 S. Ct. 1354, in which the Court discussed its analysis regarding eh definition f he word "persons" as used in the antitrust laws not meant to exclude corporate officers and directors by stating, "The reasons for section 14 [Clayton Act] are sufficiently revealed by the legislative history . . . The reports provide no assistance but the debates do . ."[§14] is merely a reenactment of the Sherman law, sections 1, 2, and 3. It has always been held that the officers of corporations violating the law wee punishable under these sections."
The plaintiff holds that the 'artificial person' of the defendant [Federally Chartered Corporation] is only capable of injuring another person through a natural person, e.g., an officer, director, or authorized agent.
THE LANHAM ACT APPLIES TO 36 U.S.C. §371 et. seq.
In the amending of 36 U.S.C. § 371 et. seq. (1950) into the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, a provision was added to apply the rights and remedies available under the Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act] to all existing rights and privileges encompassed in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. In the defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p.8 line 11, "As regards is constitutionality, section 380 presents no different issue that traditional trademarks and the right to exclusive use of the words comprising the mark that trademark law grants to the holder."
In the treatise on trademarks by Dubroff & Seidel, Trademark Law and Practice, §1:06 declaring the general principals regarding trademarks, "It must be of such a nature as to permit exclusive appropriation by one person . . . [U]nless the trademark performs its proper function, neither can the first adopter be injured by appropriation or imitation of it [TM] by others, nor can the public be deceived."
Olympic has not been exclusively appropriated by the defendant, whether rights exist to that effect, or not. It is important to note that olympic cannot be appropriated by any person, not even the defendant, and at this time the only way to exclusively appropriate olympic wold be to take it away from all other persons who have various rights and titles thereto, an impossible accomplishment.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that judgment be had against the defendant as demanded in his First Amended Complaint.
The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix C
APPENDIX C
FEDERAL COURT RECORD
TABLE OF EVIDENCE Case No. CV 85 481 RG, Central District CA
Clerk's record. Leo Oliver LaBranche Jr. v. USOC (A corporation)
Declaration of authenticity of television broadcast.
Exhibit 1, P.T.O. refusal.
Exhibits 3-6, C.B.S. broadcast transcript
Exhibits 7-10, Legal Trade Publication.
Exhibits 11, 16-26 assorted corporations, permits & licenses.
Exhibits 27-31, New York Certificates. [Good Standing]
Exhibits 32-36, Minnesota Certificates.
Exhibits 37, 38, Indiana Certificates.
Exhibits 39-48, Wisconsin Certificates.
Exhibits 49-60, North Carolina Certificates.
Exhibits 61-65, Ohio Certificates.
Exhibits 66-69, Illinois Certificates.
Exhibits 70-72, Florida Certificates.
Exhibits 73-75, Georgia Certificates.
Exhibits 76-80, Maryland Certificates.
Exhibits 81-89, Texas Certificates.
Exhibits 90-94, Virginia Certificates.
Exhibits 95-97, Rhode Island.
Exhibits 98-101, Arizona Certificates.
Exhibits 102-105, Nebraska Certificates.
Exhibits 106-110, Oklahoma Certificates.
Exhibits 111-116, COLORADO Certificates-USOC home state.
Exhibits 141-153, Policy of states of NY, MN, MA, OH, IL, IA, TX, RI, AZ, NE, SC, OK, WA
Exhibits 154-158, New York list from tax board.
Exhibits 159-172, California computer print-out.
Exhibits 197-199, Ohio computer print-out.
Exhibits 200-203, Florida computer print-out.
Exhibits 204, 205, Maryland reply w/list.
Exhibits 206, South Carolina letter reply.
Exhibits 224-227, Pennsylvania computer print-out.
Exhibits 228, 229, New Mexico computer print-out.
Exhibits 230-232, Certified letter sent by USOC to all states during 1978.
Exhibits 233, Interstate Commerce Commission computer p/o.
Exhibits 237, Important letter reply from U.S. Copyright Office.
Exhibits 249, 250, F.S.L.I.C. computer print-out.
Exhibits 251-252, various refusals from Florida, Georgia,
Alabama, Michigan, and California.
Exhibits 256-258, Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq..
Exhibits 297-300, Massachusetts corporations, list of contents.
Exhibits 521, 522, Microfiche No. 26 & 27 received from State of WA
Exhibits 523, 526, Compilation from microfiche.
These exhibits are a small percentage of the number of businesses and corporations throughout the United States.
End : Table of contents of bound exhibits.
FEDERAL COURT RECORD
TABLE OF EVIDENCE Case No. CV 85 481 RG, Central District CA
Clerk's record. Leo Oliver LaBranche Jr. v. USOC (A corporation)
Declaration of authenticity of television broadcast.
Exhibit 1, P.T.O. refusal.
Exhibits 3-6, C.B.S. broadcast transcript
Exhibits 7-10, Legal Trade Publication.
Exhibits 11, 16-26 assorted corporations, permits & licenses.
Exhibits 27-31, New York Certificates. [Good Standing]
Exhibits 32-36, Minnesota Certificates.
Exhibits 37, 38, Indiana Certificates.
Exhibits 39-48, Wisconsin Certificates.
Exhibits 49-60, North Carolina Certificates.
Exhibits 61-65, Ohio Certificates.
Exhibits 66-69, Illinois Certificates.
Exhibits 70-72, Florida Certificates.
Exhibits 73-75, Georgia Certificates.
Exhibits 76-80, Maryland Certificates.
Exhibits 81-89, Texas Certificates.
Exhibits 90-94, Virginia Certificates.
Exhibits 95-97, Rhode Island.
Exhibits 98-101, Arizona Certificates.
Exhibits 102-105, Nebraska Certificates.
Exhibits 106-110, Oklahoma Certificates.
Exhibits 111-116, COLORADO Certificates-USOC home state.
Exhibits 141-153, Policy of states of NY, MN, MA, OH, IL, IA, TX, RI, AZ, NE, SC, OK, WA
Exhibits 154-158, New York list from tax board.
Exhibits 159-172, California computer print-out.
Exhibits 197-199, Ohio computer print-out.
Exhibits 200-203, Florida computer print-out.
Exhibits 204, 205, Maryland reply w/list.
Exhibits 206, South Carolina letter reply.
Exhibits 224-227, Pennsylvania computer print-out.
Exhibits 228, 229, New Mexico computer print-out.
Exhibits 230-232, Certified letter sent by USOC to all states during 1978.
Exhibits 233, Interstate Commerce Commission computer p/o.
Exhibits 237, Important letter reply from U.S. Copyright Office.
Exhibits 249, 250, F.S.L.I.C. computer print-out.
Exhibits 251-252, various refusals from Florida, Georgia,
Alabama, Michigan, and California.
Exhibits 256-258, Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq..
Exhibits 297-300, Massachusetts corporations, list of contents.
Exhibits 521, 522, Microfiche No. 26 & 27 received from State of WA
Exhibits 523, 526, Compilation from microfiche.
These exhibits are a small percentage of the number of businesses and corporations throughout the United States.
End : Table of contents of bound exhibits.
The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix B
APPENDIX B
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
U.S. District Court
Central District of California
Case CV 85 481 RG
LABRANCHE v USOC
PLAINTIFF COMPLAINS AGAINST DEFENDANT AND FOR A FIRST CLAIM OF RELIEF ALLEGES:
JURISDICTION:
Federal questions and the amount in Controversy exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars. Actions arises under the Constitution of the United States: Article I, Section 8-clause 3; Article IV section 1 & 2; The First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the 9th and 10th Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; and upon jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1338(b), and 15 U.S.C. sections 2 and 15 as more fully hereinafter appears.
CAUSE OF ACTION
1. On April 26, 1984 the plaintiff was refused the right to register his trademark and design by the P.T.O. pursuant to the section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.
2. On August 1, 1984 a C.B.S. network broadcast titled, "Crossroads" aired and was viewed by the plaintiff, during which the defendant made statements to the effect that, "anyone using the word olympic after 1950 was violating the Act and would be litigated by the defendant.
3. Article in legal trade publication, "Los Angeles Lawyer" (July issue), repeats threat of litigation to all unauthorized users of the word Olympic.
4. An investment of more than $100,000 has been used for the formation and foundation of of plaintiff's business and that is jeopardized by the defendant's statements and threats.
5. Plaintiff formed the New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., January 5, 1983 and that entity and its stock owned by the plaintiff is denied full faith and credit and put in jeopardy by the defendant and section 380 of the Act.
6. Plaintiff formed his business on September 15, 1982 and has legally acquired and obtained all licenses and permits necessary to conduct his business and these licenses and permits are denied credit pursuant to the defendant and section 380 of the Act.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - - CHARGES AND OFFENSES
I. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Non-enforcement/selective enforcement
II. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Right to Contract
III. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Pursue Business of Chosen Profession
IV. First Amendment: Freedom from Prior Restraint
V. 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amends. Over breadth of Legislation
VI. Article IV, §1. Full Faith and Credit Denied
VII. Article IV, §2. Property rights in Stock, and trademark
VIII. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
IX. Fourteenth Amendment: Privileges and Immunities
X. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Denial of valid Copyrights
XI. Tenth Amendment: Persons and States rights.
XII. Ninth Amendment: Privacy and Reputation
XIII. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Illegal Trademark registration
XIV. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Unfair Use of Trademark
XV. 15 U.S.C. §2, Sherman Act. Attempted Monopoly
XVI. Article I, §8, clause 3. Attempt to Regulate Interstate Comm.
XVII. 15 U.S.C. §15, Clayton Act. Interference with right to trade and exist
COUNT NO. 1
1). Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act is being selectively enforced or not enforced at all in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2). Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act remained dormant for 28 to 30 years in violation of Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act.
3). Plaintiff claims, and provides proof, of non-enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act by the following Federal Agencies:
(a) Internal revenue Service (b) Interstate Commerce Commission (c) Copyright Office (d)Comptroller of the Currency (e) Securities and Exchange Commission (f) F.D.I.C. (g) F.S.L.I.C. in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
4). Plaintiff claims non-enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act in the following states: NY, MN, IN, WI, NC, OH, IL, FL, GA, MA, TX, VA, RI, AZ, NE, SC. OK, and WA in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
5). Plaintiff claims selective enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act in the following states: AL, MI, CA in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT NO. 2
Liberty to Contract
6). Plaintiff claims his liberty to contract is prohibited pursuant to §380 of the Amateur Act in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT NO. 3
Pursue Chosen Profession
7). Plaintiff claims his "right to pursue the business of his chosen profession" is denied by Plaintiff claims in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT NO. 4
Prior Restraint of Free Speech
8). Plaintiff claims §380 of the Amateur Act and the defendant require that permission be obtained for use of a "a spoken word" which is an illegal exercise in "prior restraint" in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment.
COUNT NO. 5
Overbreadth of Legislation
9). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is unconstitutionally broad because it is susceptible of application to the plaintiff's conduct which is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
10). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is "invalid as applied" because it is not capable of being enforced against all alike under the same circumstances, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
11). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is "invalid as not applied" because the Amateur Act is not enforced by Federal Agencies (except the PTO) and not enforced by 46 +/- 2 states in violation of the plaintiff's rights.
COUNT NO. 6
Full Faith and Credit
12). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to permits and licenses legally acquired in the state of California, in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Full Faith and Credit provision of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution.
13). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to the New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Full Faith and Credit provision of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
14). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to corporations, businesses, and copyright holders included as evidence in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated" guaranteed by Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 7
Violation of Article IV, Section 2
15). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the right to own or sell stock in the legally formed New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and further guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
16). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the right to design, own, and register a trademark and design in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
17). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the plaintiff's business the right to exist in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 8
Equal Protection of Laws
18). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, violates the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
19). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is explicit in its prohibitions and as such reach and include all persons in the state of California, with no exceptions, and the state only selectively prohibits corporations using the word olympic and has no enforcement policy regarding any and all others, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20). Plaintiff claims that the State Board of Equalization allows foreign corporations with olympic as apart of their corporate name to obtain a sales Tax resale license issued by the state of California, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated," guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21). Plaintiff claims that that the state of California denies corporate protection (umbrella) for its legally formed businesses using the word olympic, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated," guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 9
Privileges & Immunities
22). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, forbids persons to incorporate in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
23). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California does not treat all person "similarly situated" alike in regard to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
24). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, denies plaintiff's right to form a corporation, own stock, design and own a trademark or obtain a foreign corporation license, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by virtue of National Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
25). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, denies plaintiff's "right to protect his business, property, trademark, and his investment of time, effort, and capital in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by virtue of National Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
26). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, "authorizes" the state to violate the Equal Protection provision and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the 14th Amendment.
COUNT NO. 10
Violation of 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
27). Plaintiff claims that the federal law and the defendant deny credit and validity to U. S. Copyrights owned or held by the plaintiff in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §102(2)(5)(7) and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
28). Plaintiff claims that Copyright registration number SR 49-369 and VA 137-790, owned by the plaintiff, are denied credit and validity by § 380 of the Amateur Act and by the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §106(1-3) and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
29). Plaintiff claims that the federal law and the defendant deny credit to ALL copyrights legally issued by the Register of Copyrights to the plaintiff and over five hundred (500) others "similarly situated" in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq. and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 11
Violation of the Tenth Amendment
30). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act has been ignored, taken exception to, avoided, or otherwise rejected by state officers, state attorneys, state tax boards, and state corporation commissions; and plaintiff claims, and proves in evidence, that 46 +/- 2 of the states have chosen not to violate the rights of their citizens even though the Amateur Act gives (illegal) authority to do so, and consequently §380 of the Amateur Act is in violation of the plaintiff's and the states' rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.
31). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act enacted by Congress is defective as applied, and as not applied,and plaintiff claims the Act was brought to the attention of the states in 1978 which plaintiff claims is 28 years too late for the Act to have any effect except an unconstitutional one, and this dormancy of the Act violates plaintiff's and states' rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 12
Violation of the 9th Amendment
32). Plaintiff claims that the defendant and §380 of the Amateur Act are denying plaintiff's right to privacy by intrusions created by the appearance of the defendant on August 1, 1984 network television broadcast during which the defendant 'warned' the general public that all businesses or person using the word Olympic without their permission was violating the Amateur Act and would be litigated by the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
33). Plaintiff claims that the defendant in the act of supporting the Amateur Act by appearing on network television has blatantly, obnoxiously, unwarrantedly, and with reckless disregard, attacked the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," in violation of the plaintiff's right of Privacy and Reputation guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 13
Illegal Trademark Registration - the word Olympic
34). Plaintiff claims that trademark registration number 968,566 (trademark/servicemark/collective membership mark- the word olympic) owned and used by the defendant is in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) because the defendant has no control over use of the mark and for all practical purposes the mark has been abandoned to the public (who always owned it) in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946 [15 U.S.C. 1064 (c)] and the plaintiff's rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
35). Plaintiff claims this registered trademark has been used, and is being used, to further an attempt to partially monopolize using this illegal and invalid registration by attempting to preclude all others from registering any mark in any class of goods using the word olympic, and this mark has been used for and as unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) and violates plaintiff's right to be afforded protection of a Registration on the Principal Register of the P.T.O..
36). Plaintiff claims hat this registration was obtained and issued in error because the year the registration was issued (1971) there were, and still are, numerous (1000's) of legal businesses and corporations using the word olympic in each of the classes of goods the defendant claims exclusive rights in, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1064 (c) and the plaintiff's rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 14
Unfair Use of Trademark 980,734
37). Plaintiff claim's the defendant's mark, registration no. 980,734, has been used for the purposes on unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(7) of the Trademark Act and the plaintiff's right to be admitted on the register of the P.T.O..
38). Plaintiff claims that in 1978 the defendant gave notice to all the states that §380 of Amateur Act was in effect and that each state should now prevent their citizens, and the citizens of other states, from forming corporations using the word olympic, and also requested enforcement assistance (this mark was used on the notice) in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
39). Plaintiff claims unfair competition regarding this mark because the notice to the states suggests no policy regarding unincorporated businesses, and in effect, discriminates against corporations in violation of the rights of the class (corporations) of which the plaintiff claims membership, guaranteed by the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 15
Violation of Sherman Act, section 2
40). Plaintiff re-alleges jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §1338(b), as this and proceeding counts are associated with Counts No. 13 & 14.
41). Plaintiff claims that defendant is attempting to exclude the plaintiff, and others "similarly situated" fro doing legal, unobstructed interstates commerce in the violation of the plaintiff's rights under 15 U.S.C. section 2.
42). Plaintiff claims the defendant has warned the general public, including the plaintiff, that litigation will follow any unauthorized use of the word olympic, which under present circumstances, is "impossible," due to the several thousand legitimate businesses and corporations now in existence, in violation of plaintiff's rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and in violation of the Sherman Act, section 2.
43). Plaintiff claims that the defendant appeared on network television August 1, 1984 to proclaim the Amateur Act and their rights under it, and this appearance was a blatant example of attempted monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, section 2.
44). Plaintiff claims actions of the defendant's part designed to intimidate weaker opponents, while avoiding confrontations with those stronger than the defendant, is an illegal attempt to perpetuate a partial monopoly at the expense of the weaker party or parties, violation of the plaintiff's rights, and the rights of all others similarly situated, under 15 U.S.C. section 2.
COUNT NO. 16
Violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
45). Plaintiff claims that the defendant is attempting to regulate interstate commerce, in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
46). Plaintiff claims the Amateur Act includes illegal provisions which entitle the defendant to act in a predatory manner, to attempt to regulate legal commercial businesses and corporations in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
47). Plaintiff claims that the Amateur Act is explicit in its prohibitions, and these prohibitions reach and include all persons, natural and artificial, in the United States, yet the defendant suggests to the states that they only prohibit corporations, in contravention of the Amateur Act itself, which prohibits all person, in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
COUNT NO.17
Violation of 15 U.S.C., Section 15
48). Plaintiff claims that the defendant has illegally interfered with the plaintiff's right to trade, and plaintiff's business the right to exist in violation of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts.
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
U.S. District Court
Central District of California
Case CV 85 481 RG
LABRANCHE v USOC
PLAINTIFF COMPLAINS AGAINST DEFENDANT AND FOR A FIRST CLAIM OF RELIEF ALLEGES:
JURISDICTION:
Federal questions and the amount in Controversy exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars. Actions arises under the Constitution of the United States: Article I, Section 8-clause 3; Article IV section 1 & 2; The First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the 9th and 10th Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; and upon jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1338(b), and 15 U.S.C. sections 2 and 15 as more fully hereinafter appears.
CAUSE OF ACTION
1. On April 26, 1984 the plaintiff was refused the right to register his trademark and design by the P.T.O. pursuant to the section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.
2. On August 1, 1984 a C.B.S. network broadcast titled, "Crossroads" aired and was viewed by the plaintiff, during which the defendant made statements to the effect that, "anyone using the word olympic after 1950 was violating the Act and would be litigated by the defendant.
3. Article in legal trade publication, "Los Angeles Lawyer" (July issue), repeats threat of litigation to all unauthorized users of the word Olympic.
4. An investment of more than $100,000 has been used for the formation and foundation of of plaintiff's business and that is jeopardized by the defendant's statements and threats.
5. Plaintiff formed the New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., January 5, 1983 and that entity and its stock owned by the plaintiff is denied full faith and credit and put in jeopardy by the defendant and section 380 of the Act.
6. Plaintiff formed his business on September 15, 1982 and has legally acquired and obtained all licenses and permits necessary to conduct his business and these licenses and permits are denied credit pursuant to the defendant and section 380 of the Act.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - - CHARGES AND OFFENSES
I. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Non-enforcement/selective enforcement
II. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Right to Contract
III. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Pursue Business of Chosen Profession
IV. First Amendment: Freedom from Prior Restraint
V. 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amends. Over breadth of Legislation
VI. Article IV, §1. Full Faith and Credit Denied
VII. Article IV, §2. Property rights in Stock, and trademark
VIII. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
IX. Fourteenth Amendment: Privileges and Immunities
X. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Denial of valid Copyrights
XI. Tenth Amendment: Persons and States rights.
XII. Ninth Amendment: Privacy and Reputation
XIII. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Illegal Trademark registration
XIV. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Unfair Use of Trademark
XV. 15 U.S.C. §2, Sherman Act. Attempted Monopoly
XVI. Article I, §8, clause 3. Attempt to Regulate Interstate Comm.
XVII. 15 U.S.C. §15, Clayton Act. Interference with right to trade and exist
COUNT NO. 1
1). Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act is being selectively enforced or not enforced at all in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2). Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act remained dormant for 28 to 30 years in violation of Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act.
3). Plaintiff claims, and provides proof, of non-enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act by the following Federal Agencies:
(a) Internal revenue Service (b) Interstate Commerce Commission (c) Copyright Office (d)Comptroller of the Currency (e) Securities and Exchange Commission (f) F.D.I.C. (g) F.S.L.I.C. in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
4). Plaintiff claims non-enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act in the following states: NY, MN, IN, WI, NC, OH, IL, FL, GA, MA, TX, VA, RI, AZ, NE, SC. OK, and WA in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
5). Plaintiff claims selective enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act in the following states: AL, MI, CA in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT NO. 2
Liberty to Contract
6). Plaintiff claims his liberty to contract is prohibited pursuant to §380 of the Amateur Act in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT NO. 3
Pursue Chosen Profession
7). Plaintiff claims his "right to pursue the business of his chosen profession" is denied by Plaintiff claims in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT NO. 4
Prior Restraint of Free Speech
8). Plaintiff claims §380 of the Amateur Act and the defendant require that permission be obtained for use of a "a spoken word" which is an illegal exercise in "prior restraint" in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment.
COUNT NO. 5
Overbreadth of Legislation
9). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is unconstitutionally broad because it is susceptible of application to the plaintiff's conduct which is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
10). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is "invalid as applied" because it is not capable of being enforced against all alike under the same circumstances, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
11). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is "invalid as not applied" because the Amateur Act is not enforced by Federal Agencies (except the PTO) and not enforced by 46 +/- 2 states in violation of the plaintiff's rights.
COUNT NO. 6
Full Faith and Credit
12). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to permits and licenses legally acquired in the state of California, in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Full Faith and Credit provision of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution.
13). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to the New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Full Faith and Credit provision of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
14). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to corporations, businesses, and copyright holders included as evidence in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated" guaranteed by Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 7
Violation of Article IV, Section 2
15). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the right to own or sell stock in the legally formed New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and further guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
16). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the right to design, own, and register a trademark and design in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
17). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the plaintiff's business the right to exist in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 8
Equal Protection of Laws
18). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, violates the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
19). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is explicit in its prohibitions and as such reach and include all persons in the state of California, with no exceptions, and the state only selectively prohibits corporations using the word olympic and has no enforcement policy regarding any and all others, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20). Plaintiff claims that the State Board of Equalization allows foreign corporations with olympic as apart of their corporate name to obtain a sales Tax resale license issued by the state of California, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated," guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21). Plaintiff claims that that the state of California denies corporate protection (umbrella) for its legally formed businesses using the word olympic, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated," guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 9
Privileges & Immunities
22). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, forbids persons to incorporate in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
23). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California does not treat all person "similarly situated" alike in regard to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
24). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, denies plaintiff's right to form a corporation, own stock, design and own a trademark or obtain a foreign corporation license, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by virtue of National Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
25). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, denies plaintiff's "right to protect his business, property, trademark, and his investment of time, effort, and capital in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by virtue of National Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
26). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, "authorizes" the state to violate the Equal Protection provision and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the 14th Amendment.
COUNT NO. 10
Violation of 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
27). Plaintiff claims that the federal law and the defendant deny credit and validity to U. S. Copyrights owned or held by the plaintiff in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §102(2)(5)(7) and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
28). Plaintiff claims that Copyright registration number SR 49-369 and VA 137-790, owned by the plaintiff, are denied credit and validity by § 380 of the Amateur Act and by the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §106(1-3) and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
29). Plaintiff claims that the federal law and the defendant deny credit to ALL copyrights legally issued by the Register of Copyrights to the plaintiff and over five hundred (500) others "similarly situated" in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq. and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 11
Violation of the Tenth Amendment
30). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act has been ignored, taken exception to, avoided, or otherwise rejected by state officers, state attorneys, state tax boards, and state corporation commissions; and plaintiff claims, and proves in evidence, that 46 +/- 2 of the states have chosen not to violate the rights of their citizens even though the Amateur Act gives (illegal) authority to do so, and consequently §380 of the Amateur Act is in violation of the plaintiff's and the states' rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.
31). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act enacted by Congress is defective as applied, and as not applied,and plaintiff claims the Act was brought to the attention of the states in 1978 which plaintiff claims is 28 years too late for the Act to have any effect except an unconstitutional one, and this dormancy of the Act violates plaintiff's and states' rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 12
Violation of the 9th Amendment
32). Plaintiff claims that the defendant and §380 of the Amateur Act are denying plaintiff's right to privacy by intrusions created by the appearance of the defendant on August 1, 1984 network television broadcast during which the defendant 'warned' the general public that all businesses or person using the word Olympic without their permission was violating the Amateur Act and would be litigated by the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
33). Plaintiff claims that the defendant in the act of supporting the Amateur Act by appearing on network television has blatantly, obnoxiously, unwarrantedly, and with reckless disregard, attacked the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," in violation of the plaintiff's right of Privacy and Reputation guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 13
Illegal Trademark Registration - the word Olympic
34). Plaintiff claims that trademark registration number 968,566 (trademark/servicemark/collective membership mark- the word olympic) owned and used by the defendant is in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) because the defendant has no control over use of the mark and for all practical purposes the mark has been abandoned to the public (who always owned it) in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946 [15 U.S.C. 1064 (c)] and the plaintiff's rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
35). Plaintiff claims this registered trademark has been used, and is being used, to further an attempt to partially monopolize using this illegal and invalid registration by attempting to preclude all others from registering any mark in any class of goods using the word olympic, and this mark has been used for and as unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) and violates plaintiff's right to be afforded protection of a Registration on the Principal Register of the P.T.O..
36). Plaintiff claims hat this registration was obtained and issued in error because the year the registration was issued (1971) there were, and still are, numerous (1000's) of legal businesses and corporations using the word olympic in each of the classes of goods the defendant claims exclusive rights in, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1064 (c) and the plaintiff's rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 14
Unfair Use of Trademark 980,734
37). Plaintiff claim's the defendant's mark, registration no. 980,734, has been used for the purposes on unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(7) of the Trademark Act and the plaintiff's right to be admitted on the register of the P.T.O..
38). Plaintiff claims that in 1978 the defendant gave notice to all the states that §380 of Amateur Act was in effect and that each state should now prevent their citizens, and the citizens of other states, from forming corporations using the word olympic, and also requested enforcement assistance (this mark was used on the notice) in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
39). Plaintiff claims unfair competition regarding this mark because the notice to the states suggests no policy regarding unincorporated businesses, and in effect, discriminates against corporations in violation of the rights of the class (corporations) of which the plaintiff claims membership, guaranteed by the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
COUNT NO. 15
Violation of Sherman Act, section 2
40). Plaintiff re-alleges jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §1338(b), as this and proceeding counts are associated with Counts No. 13 & 14.
41). Plaintiff claims that defendant is attempting to exclude the plaintiff, and others "similarly situated" fro doing legal, unobstructed interstates commerce in the violation of the plaintiff's rights under 15 U.S.C. section 2.
42). Plaintiff claims the defendant has warned the general public, including the plaintiff, that litigation will follow any unauthorized use of the word olympic, which under present circumstances, is "impossible," due to the several thousand legitimate businesses and corporations now in existence, in violation of plaintiff's rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and in violation of the Sherman Act, section 2.
43). Plaintiff claims that the defendant appeared on network television August 1, 1984 to proclaim the Amateur Act and their rights under it, and this appearance was a blatant example of attempted monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, section 2.
44). Plaintiff claims actions of the defendant's part designed to intimidate weaker opponents, while avoiding confrontations with those stronger than the defendant, is an illegal attempt to perpetuate a partial monopoly at the expense of the weaker party or parties, violation of the plaintiff's rights, and the rights of all others similarly situated, under 15 U.S.C. section 2.
COUNT NO. 16
Violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
45). Plaintiff claims that the defendant is attempting to regulate interstate commerce, in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
46). Plaintiff claims the Amateur Act includes illegal provisions which entitle the defendant to act in a predatory manner, to attempt to regulate legal commercial businesses and corporations in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
47). Plaintiff claims that the Amateur Act is explicit in its prohibitions, and these prohibitions reach and include all persons, natural and artificial, in the United States, yet the defendant suggests to the states that they only prohibit corporations, in contravention of the Amateur Act itself, which prohibits all person, in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
COUNT NO.17
Violation of 15 U.S.C., Section 15
48). Plaintiff claims that the defendant has illegally interfered with the plaintiff's right to trade, and plaintiff's business the right to exist in violation of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts.
The Olympic Record Appendix A
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A Pro Se Litigant Information
APPENDIX B FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
APPENDIX C TOC - EVIDENCE
APPENDIX D LEGAL BRIEF
APPENDIX E CASE LAWS AND STATUTES
APPENDIX F FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
APPENDIX G PARTIAL LIST OF OLYMPIC BUSINESSES
**************************************
APPENDIX A
PRO SE LITIGANT EXPLANATIONS AND COMMENTS
Had there been an internet what follows would have been compiled and available, and, had I known these statistics there would have come a time of sober, or, not so sober, reflection re being a pre se litigant. As it turned I had no choice so forward went the wagons. With the following information you can determine whether you would want to represent yourself in any court, unless of course, you had no choice (and even then).
Wikipedia Generalizations
Pro se legal representation refers to the instance of a person representing himself or herself, without a lawyer, in a court proceeding, whether as a defendant or a plaintiff and whether the matter is civil or criminal. Pro se is a Latin phrase meaning "for oneself." This status is sometimes known as propria persona (abbreviated to "pro per"). Many state and the federal courts systems are experiencing an increasing proportion of pro se litigants. In the United States federal court system for the year 2007 approximately 27% of actions filed, 92% of prisoner petitions, and 10% of non-prisoner petitions, were filed by pro se litigants. The right of a party to a legal action to represent his or her own cause has long been recognized in the United States, and even predates the ratification of the Constitution. The Supreme Court noted that "[i]n the federal courts the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 signed by President Washington, one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed which provided that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel."
Section 1654 of title 28 of the United States Code provides: "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." Most states have a constitutional provision that either expressly, or by interpretation, allows individuals to represent their own causes in the courts of that state.
Limits
In some situations, self-represented appearances are not allowed. Generally, an owner can represent a solely owned business or partnership, but only a licensed attorney can represent a corporation. The ability of a party to proceed without an attorney in prosecuting or defending a civil action is largely a matter of state law, and may vary depending on the court and the positions of the parties. A longstanding and widely practiced rule prohibits corporations from being represented by non-attorneys, consistent with the existence of a corporation as a "person" separate and distinct from its officers and employees. Few federal court of appeals allow unrepresented litigants to argue, and in all courts the percentage of cases in which argument occurs is higher for counseled cases.
Notable pro se litigants
The pro se defendant in Kolender v. Lawson (461 U.S. 352, 1983), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a police officer could not arrest a citizen merely for refusing to present identification.
Robert Kerns was the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper. He acted as his own lawyer in parts of his long legal battles for patent infringement against Ford and Chrysler. His legal battles are the subject of the 2008 film, Flash of Genius.
Clarence Earl Gideon was too poor to afford an attorney and thus proceeded pro se in his criminal trial in Florida in 1961. He was found guilty and subsequently appealed. He was appointed counsel when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court; the Court ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright that the right to counsel means that states are required to provide counsel free of charge to indigent criminal defendants and that Florida's failure to appoint such counsel in Gideon's case constituted a violation of that right. On remand Gideon was represented in the new trial, and was acquitted.
Brandon Moon spent 17 years in jail for a rape that he did not commit. He was convicted after being picked from a lineup 18 months after the rape in which he was the only blue eyed white man. He was a sophomore in college and a veteran of four years in the air force when he was accused. He was released due to DNA evidence after help from the Innocence Project. He spent his prison years learning about blood tests, eye witness identification and law. Before the Innocence Project became involved, Moon represented himself and repeatedly applied for relief but, according to his lawyer he was "bounced around the courts like a Ping-Pong ball" because "The courts are so hostile to pro se litigants. The instinct is to deny, deny, deny."
Thomas Van Orden, a lawyer with a suspended license to practice law who was living homeless in Austin, Texas managed to challenge a religious display on the state capitol grounds, and successfully navigated his case all the way to the Supreme Court. While he was ultimately unsuccessful at getting the display removed, he was extremely successful at litigating the case.
Anthony Pellicano, a Los Angeles-based private investigator known for working with high-profile entertainment industry attorneys, represented himself in federal district court after being indicted on numerous counts of criminal conspiracy and wiretapping charges. He fired his attorneys prior to trial. He was convicted on all but one count. He also faced a second trial along with co-defendant Terry Christiansen. He again represented himself and again was convicted on numerous counts.
Barbara Schwarz, of Salt Lake City, Utah has filed a large number of Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests. When the responses failed to verify her claims, she responded with litigation, which she has done pro se. At least one of her lawsuits have been considered by a U.S. District or U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals somewhere in the nation every year since 1993."
James Traficant, a former U.S. Representative from Ohio, represented himself in a RICO case in 1983, and was acquitted of all charges, becoming the only person to ever win a RICO case while representing himself. Traficant would represent himself again in 2002, this time unsuccessfully, and was sentenced to prison for 8 years for taking bribes, filing false tax returns, and racketeering.
Lenny Bruce represented himself in a number of obscenity trials, including Chicago Gate of Horn case, People v. Bruce.
Resources
Self-represented litigants may turn to "self-help" assistance. These tend to come from three sources: local courts, which may offer limited self-help assistance; and public interest groups, such as the American Bar Association, which sponsors reform and promotes resources for self-help, and services which sell pre-made forms allowing self-represented parties to have correct documents.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has also been involved with issues related to self-representation. The ABA has awarded a grant in 2008 to the Chicago Kent College of Law Center for Access to Justice & Technology for making justice more accessible to the public through the use of the Internet in teaching, legal practice and public access to the law. Their A2J Author Project is a software tool that empowers those from the courts, legal services programs and educational institutions to create guided interviews resulting in document assembly, electronic filing and data collection. Viewers using A2J to go through a guided interview are led down a virtual pathway to the courthouse. As they answer simple questions about their legal issue, the technology then “translates” the answers to create, or assemble, the documents that are needed for filing with the court.
In representing oneself as Pro Se litigant, access to the WESTLAW database of legal practices and appellate court decisions, will provided valuable information on cause of action and elements of proof outlines for basic Complaint and Summary Judgment filings. Valuable case citations giving guidance in forming interrogative (discovery) questions, by state, are also easily extracted and copied to portable (thumb)drives for inclusion in personal records, or other court work. Free Access to this very costly subscription internet database resource is commonly available in the local law library, and in some locations goes basically unused in the towns main library. Internet access to State and Federal statutes provides useful insight into what is currently considered right or wrong conduct by law enforcement or individuals. Internet access to County, State and Federal public domain databases concerning property tax appraisal records, corporations, trusts and other legal entities can often provide (after diligent searching) much useful information on the policies and practices of the opposing individual and their counsel. Also, numerous examples of common complaint problems or pleadings are found on the internet, along with sometimes helpful videos produced by concerned lawyers.
APPENDIX A Pro Se Litigant Information
APPENDIX B FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
APPENDIX C TOC - EVIDENCE
APPENDIX D LEGAL BRIEF
APPENDIX E CASE LAWS AND STATUTES
APPENDIX F FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
APPENDIX G PARTIAL LIST OF OLYMPIC BUSINESSES
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APPENDIX A
PRO SE LITIGANT EXPLANATIONS AND COMMENTS
Had there been an internet what follows would have been compiled and available, and, had I known these statistics there would have come a time of sober, or, not so sober, reflection re being a pre se litigant. As it turned I had no choice so forward went the wagons. With the following information you can determine whether you would want to represent yourself in any court, unless of course, you had no choice (and even then).
Wikipedia Generalizations
Pro se legal representation refers to the instance of a person representing himself or herself, without a lawyer, in a court proceeding, whether as a defendant or a plaintiff and whether the matter is civil or criminal. Pro se is a Latin phrase meaning "for oneself." This status is sometimes known as propria persona (abbreviated to "pro per"). Many state and the federal courts systems are experiencing an increasing proportion of pro se litigants. In the United States federal court system for the year 2007 approximately 27% of actions filed, 92% of prisoner petitions, and 10% of non-prisoner petitions, were filed by pro se litigants. The right of a party to a legal action to represent his or her own cause has long been recognized in the United States, and even predates the ratification of the Constitution. The Supreme Court noted that "[i]n the federal courts the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 signed by President Washington, one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed which provided that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel."
Section 1654 of title 28 of the United States Code provides: "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." Most states have a constitutional provision that either expressly, or by interpretation, allows individuals to represent their own causes in the courts of that state.
Limits
In some situations, self-represented appearances are not allowed. Generally, an owner can represent a solely owned business or partnership, but only a licensed attorney can represent a corporation. The ability of a party to proceed without an attorney in prosecuting or defending a civil action is largely a matter of state law, and may vary depending on the court and the positions of the parties. A longstanding and widely practiced rule prohibits corporations from being represented by non-attorneys, consistent with the existence of a corporation as a "person" separate and distinct from its officers and employees. Few federal court of appeals allow unrepresented litigants to argue, and in all courts the percentage of cases in which argument occurs is higher for counseled cases.
Notable pro se litigants
The pro se defendant in Kolender v. Lawson (461 U.S. 352, 1983), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a police officer could not arrest a citizen merely for refusing to present identification.
Robert Kerns was the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper. He acted as his own lawyer in parts of his long legal battles for patent infringement against Ford and Chrysler. His legal battles are the subject of the 2008 film, Flash of Genius.
Clarence Earl Gideon was too poor to afford an attorney and thus proceeded pro se in his criminal trial in Florida in 1961. He was found guilty and subsequently appealed. He was appointed counsel when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court; the Court ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright that the right to counsel means that states are required to provide counsel free of charge to indigent criminal defendants and that Florida's failure to appoint such counsel in Gideon's case constituted a violation of that right. On remand Gideon was represented in the new trial, and was acquitted.
Brandon Moon spent 17 years in jail for a rape that he did not commit. He was convicted after being picked from a lineup 18 months after the rape in which he was the only blue eyed white man. He was a sophomore in college and a veteran of four years in the air force when he was accused. He was released due to DNA evidence after help from the Innocence Project. He spent his prison years learning about blood tests, eye witness identification and law. Before the Innocence Project became involved, Moon represented himself and repeatedly applied for relief but, according to his lawyer he was "bounced around the courts like a Ping-Pong ball" because "The courts are so hostile to pro se litigants. The instinct is to deny, deny, deny."
Thomas Van Orden, a lawyer with a suspended license to practice law who was living homeless in Austin, Texas managed to challenge a religious display on the state capitol grounds, and successfully navigated his case all the way to the Supreme Court. While he was ultimately unsuccessful at getting the display removed, he was extremely successful at litigating the case.
Anthony Pellicano, a Los Angeles-based private investigator known for working with high-profile entertainment industry attorneys, represented himself in federal district court after being indicted on numerous counts of criminal conspiracy and wiretapping charges. He fired his attorneys prior to trial. He was convicted on all but one count. He also faced a second trial along with co-defendant Terry Christiansen. He again represented himself and again was convicted on numerous counts.
Barbara Schwarz, of Salt Lake City, Utah has filed a large number of Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests. When the responses failed to verify her claims, she responded with litigation, which she has done pro se. At least one of her lawsuits have been considered by a U.S. District or U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals somewhere in the nation every year since 1993."
James Traficant, a former U.S. Representative from Ohio, represented himself in a RICO case in 1983, and was acquitted of all charges, becoming the only person to ever win a RICO case while representing himself. Traficant would represent himself again in 2002, this time unsuccessfully, and was sentenced to prison for 8 years for taking bribes, filing false tax returns, and racketeering.
Lenny Bruce represented himself in a number of obscenity trials, including Chicago Gate of Horn case, People v. Bruce.
Resources
Self-represented litigants may turn to "self-help" assistance. These tend to come from three sources: local courts, which may offer limited self-help assistance; and public interest groups, such as the American Bar Association, which sponsors reform and promotes resources for self-help, and services which sell pre-made forms allowing self-represented parties to have correct documents.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has also been involved with issues related to self-representation. The ABA has awarded a grant in 2008 to the Chicago Kent College of Law Center for Access to Justice & Technology for making justice more accessible to the public through the use of the Internet in teaching, legal practice and public access to the law. Their A2J Author Project is a software tool that empowers those from the courts, legal services programs and educational institutions to create guided interviews resulting in document assembly, electronic filing and data collection. Viewers using A2J to go through a guided interview are led down a virtual pathway to the courthouse. As they answer simple questions about their legal issue, the technology then “translates” the answers to create, or assemble, the documents that are needed for filing with the court.
In representing oneself as Pro Se litigant, access to the WESTLAW database of legal practices and appellate court decisions, will provided valuable information on cause of action and elements of proof outlines for basic Complaint and Summary Judgment filings. Valuable case citations giving guidance in forming interrogative (discovery) questions, by state, are also easily extracted and copied to portable (thumb)drives for inclusion in personal records, or other court work. Free Access to this very costly subscription internet database resource is commonly available in the local law library, and in some locations goes basically unused in the towns main library. Internet access to State and Federal statutes provides useful insight into what is currently considered right or wrong conduct by law enforcement or individuals. Internet access to County, State and Federal public domain databases concerning property tax appraisal records, corporations, trusts and other legal entities can often provide (after diligent searching) much useful information on the policies and practices of the opposing individual and their counsel. Also, numerous examples of common complaint problems or pleadings are found on the internet, along with sometimes helpful videos produced by concerned lawyers.
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