Monday, May 31, 2010

The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix F

APPENDIX F

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

F. R. E. Rule 902(1) & 28 U.S.C. § 1739

1) "[E]vidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required as to a document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States or of any state,. . . " Hunter, Federal Trial handbook 2d, § 58.6 at 679. Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 902(1), as well as upon 28 U.S.C. § 1739, Hunter, Federal Trial Handbook 2d, § 58.7 at 681 and F. R. E. 902(4), Id. at 683 for admissibility of plaintiff's exhibits 27-140.

2) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1739 and F. R. E. 901(b)(7) for admission of exhibits 141-153 of First Amended Complaint.

3) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733, 1739 for admission of exhibits 233, 237, 238, 239-246 (F. R. E. 1003) and 247.

4) Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 803(6), 1001(3), for admission of exhibits 155-158, 160-172, 174-181, 184-196, 197-199, 201-203, 205, 207-220, 222, 224-227, 229, 234-236,248, and 250.

5) Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1732 {Federal Business Records Act} for admission of exhibit 504.

6) Plaintiff relies on F. R. E. 1006 for admission of exhibits 523-526.

7) Plaintiff relies on presumption "Omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta" as will be indicated by an (* ) in the forthcoming chart.

EXHIBIT NO. EVIDENCE RULE
1-2 28 U.S.C. § 1744.
3-6 F. R. E. 404(b), 405(b).
7-10 F. R. E. 902(6).
11* F. R. E. 1733(b), 1739.
12-14 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
16-22* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1732. 1733(b), 1739.
23-26 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
27-140* F. R. E. 902(4), 28 U.S.C. § 1739.
141-153 F. R. E. 901(b)(7).
154* F. R. E 901(b)(7)
155-158 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
159* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
160-172 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
173* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
174-181 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
183* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
184-196 F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
197-199 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
200* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
201-203 F. R. E. 803(6)(8), 1001(3)
204* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
205 F. R. E. 803(6)(8)
206 F. R. E. 901(b)(7), 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b).
207-220 F. R. E. 1001(3)
221* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
222 F. R. E. 803(6)(8)
223 F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
224-227 F. R. E. 1001(3)
228* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
229 F. R. E. 1001(3)
230* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1739
231 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b), 1739
232* F. R. E. 902(4)
233* 28 U.S.C. 1733(b).
234-236 F. R. E. 1001(3)
237* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b)
238* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b)
239-246 F. R. E. 1003
247* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733(b), 1739
248 F. R. E. 1001(3)
249-250 F. R. E. 1001(3)
251-255* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
256-258* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1739, 1733(b)
259-265* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1739, 1733(b)
267-269 F. R. E. 1006
270-289 28 U.S.C. § 1744
290-295 28 U.S.C. § 1744
297-298* F. R. E. 901(b)(7)
299-300 F. R. E. 1006
301-503* F. R. E. 1003
504 28 U.S.C. § 1732
505-520 F. R. E. 1003
521-522* F. R. E. 1003
523-526 F. R. E. 1006


In regard to DOJ appeal No. 85-0521.
Exhibits A - K attached to appeal* 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b), 1739.


8) This list of exhibits and the rules under which the plaintiff will rely on at trial are not to be construed as limiting the plaintiff from using other authorities or rules that may be omitted from the instant request.


II
PRESUMPTIONS

9) Internal Revenue Service tax I. D. numbers for any company or corporation included in and as exhibits 27-140, 155-158, 160-172, 174-181, 184-196, 197-199, 201-203, 205, 206, 207-220, 222, 223, 224-227, 229, 234-236, 239-246 (Fed. I.R.S. I.D. No. included on these documents), 248, 250, 505-520, 523-526.

10) "Omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta" applies to each exhibit followed by (*).

11) Presumption that rightful owners of property are not likely to permit their property to remain in the continued possession of others that assert title thereto, and that the possession is authorized by some grant or license. Hunter, Federal Trial Handbook 2d, § 54.12 at 648. This presumption applies to trademark registration 968,566 and is equally applicable to section 380.

The Olympic Record Appendix E

APPENDIX E

TABLE OF STATUTES and CASE LAW referenced since 06/84.

ARTICLE I, Section 8, clause 3 - - COMMERCE CLAUSE
NATL. LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY 426 US 833, 49 L Ed 2d 245 (1976)
ARTICLE I, Section 8, clause 8 - - Intellectual Property
ARTICLE IV, Section 1 - - Full Faith & Credit
ARTICLE IV, Section 2 - - Privileges & Immunities

First Amendment: Speech, Assembly, Redress

i) INTERSTATE CIRCUITS v DALLAS 390 US 676, 20 L Ed 2d 225 (1968)
ii) NRLB v CONTINENTAL OIL 159 F 2d 326 (1947)
iii) HESS v INDIANA 414 US 105, 38 L Ed 2d 303 (1973)
iv) CANTWELL v CONNECTICUT N/A religion
v) HUNTLEY v PUBLIC UTL. COMM. 69 CAL Rptr. 37 (1968)
vi) GOODING v WILSON 405 US 518, 31 L Ed 2d 408 (1972) N/A
vii) F.C.C. & U.S. v RED LION BROAD. ?
viii) LARGENT v TEXAS 318 US 418, 87 L Ed 873 (1943) N/A
ix) GRAUSAM v MURPHEY (1971) N/A
x) FINK v COLE 97 NE 2d 55
xi) KEYISIAN v BOARD OF REGENTS 385 US 589, 17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967)

a) ZACCHINI v SCRIPPS-HOWARD B. 433 US 562, 53 L. Ed 2d 965 (1977)
b) CENT. HUDSON GAS v PSC of NY 447 US 557, 65 L. Ed 2d 341(1980)
c) BUSH v LUCAS 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983)
d) BUCKLEY v VALEO 424 US 1, 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976)

Fifth Amendment: Due Process & Equal Protection

i) NEBBIA v NY 291 US 502, (1933)
ii) PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. v CHEEK 259 US , 66 L Ed 1044 (1921) corps.
iii) JOHNSON v ROBISON 415 US 361, 39 L Ed 2d 389 (1974)
iv) RASULIS v WEINBERGER 502 F 2d 500
v) USD of A v MORENO 413 US 528, 37 L Ed 782 (1973)
vi) U.S. v ANTELOPE 96 S Ct. 1100 (1976)
vii) ANNOTATION: Due Process - he 5th & 14th Amendments. 47 L Ed 2d 975
a) HECKLER v MATHEWS 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984)
b) USRRB v FRITZ 449 US 166, 66 L. Ed 2d 368 (1980)
c) SCHWEIKER v WILSON 450 us 221, 67 L.Ed 2d 186 (1981)
d) APTHEKER v SEC. OF STATE 378 US 500, 12 L Ed 2d 992 (1964)
e) GREENE v McELROY 360 US 474, 3 L Ed 2d 1377 (1959)
f) ADAIR v U.S. 208 US 161, 67 L Ed 437 (1908)

Ninth Amendment: Privacy
RIGHT OF PRIVACY - - Annotation: 43 L Ed 2d 871 S. Ct. views.
Tenth Amendment: States Rights
a) NATL LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY 426 US 833, 49 L Ed 2d 245 (1976)

Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection

i) YICK WO v HOPKINS 118 US 220, 225 (1886)
ii) LOUISVILLE GAS & ELECTRIC 227 US 32, 72 L Ed 770 (1928)
iii) FROST v CORP. COMMISSION OF OK 278 US 515, 522 (1929)
iv) TRUAX v CORRIGAN 257 US 312 (1921)
v) SHAPIRO v THOMPSON 394 US 618, 22 L Ed 2d 600 (1969)
vi) COMMONWEALTH v INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER N/A
vii) FREEDMAN v MARYLAND N/A
viii) BARROWS v JACKSON 346 US 429 (1953) regarding Cal. enforce.
ix) GRAYNED v ROCKFORD 408 US 104, 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972)
x) BLUMENTHAL v BOARD MED. EXAM 18 Cal Rptr. 501 const.
xi) PEOPLE (CA) v DUFFY 79 CA 2d Supp. 875; 179 p 2d 876 (1947)
xii) BYERS v BOARD OF SUPER. 262 CA 2d 148 (1968) constitutionality

Const. Amend. 14:

b) CLEMENTS v FASHING 102 S. Ct. 2836 (1982)
c) WASH. v SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. 458 US 457, 73 L. Ed 2d 896 (1982)
d) CHALMERS v CITY OF LA 762 F 2d 753 (1985)
e) MINN. v CLOVER LEAF CREAMERY 449 US 456, 66 L. Ed 2d 659 (1981)

Ninth Circuit: 14th Amendment cases

f) HOFFMAN v U.S. 767 F 2d 1431 (1985)
g) RICHARDS v SEC. OF STATE 752 F 2d 1413 (1985)
h) PARKS v WATSON 716 F 2d 646 (1983)
i) LEGAL AID SOC. OF ALA. CTY v BRENNAN 608 F 2d 1319 (1979)
j) ADAMS v HOWERTON 673 F 2d 1036 (1982)
k) HIRST v GERTZEN 676 F 2d 1252 (1982)

Trademark Act of 1946: Title 15 U.S.C. §§1051 et seq..

i) UNITED DRUG v THEO RECTANUS 248 US 90, 63 L Ed 141 (1918)
ii) AMER. STEEL FOUNDRIES v ROBERTSON 70 L Ed 317, (1925)
iii) STANDARD PAINT. v TRINIDAD ASPH. 220 US 453, 55 L Ed 536 (1910)
iv) G. & C. MERRIAM CO. v SAALFIELD 198 F. 369 (1912)
v) FURNITURE HOSP. v DORFMAN 166 SW 862 (1914)
vi) CORNING GLASS WORKS v PASMANTIER DC NY (1939)
vii) WALKER PROCESS v FOOD CORP. 382 US 172, 15 L Ed 2d 247 (1965)
viii) U.S. v US GYPSUM CO. 333 US 364, 92 L Ed 762 (1947)
ix) QUAKER STATE v STEINBERG N/A

a) VUITTON ET FILS S.A. v J. YOUNG ENT. 644 F 2d 769 (1981)
b) ROYER v STOODY CO. False publications ("Crossroads")
c) REDKEN v CLAIROL INC. (IMPOVERISH LANGUAGE OF COMMERCE)
d) ELLAY STORES v SAVITZ 30 F Supp 462 (1939)
e) Application of DEISTER 289 F 2d 496 (1961) Patent law.
f) CONFUSION OF SOURCE [treatise 1st restatements torts - chap. 35
Copyright Act of 1976: Title 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
COPYRIGHTABLE MATERIALS ¶ 505 - ¶ 2175
Entire code 17 U.S.C. 101-118
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION [Revised] entire text.
Sherman/Clayton Act - - Title 15 U.S.C. Section 1
Actions involving extraterritorial conduct: 24 Fed. Proc. L Ed §§ 54:115-122

a) U.S. v SOCONY-VACUUM OIL 310 US 150, (1939)
b) TREASURE VALLEY POTATO v ORE-IDA FOODS (1974)
c) FINCK v SCHNEIDER GRANITE 86 SW ___(1905)
d) U. S. v PARAMOUNT PICTURES 334 US 131, 92 L Ed 1260 (1947)
e) TODHUNTER-MITCHELL v ANHEUSER BUSCH 375 F Supp 610 (1974)
f) FLINTKOTE v LYSFJORD 246 F 2d 368 (1957)

Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 2

a) JERROLD ELEC. v WESCOAST BROAD. CO. 341 F 2d 653 (1965) N/A
b) U. S. v GRINNELL CORP. 384 US 563, 16 L Ed 2d 778 (1966)
c) BAUSH MACHINE v ALUM. CO. of AMER. 72 F 2d 236,240 (1934)
d) U.S. v AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. 221 US 106, 55 L Ed 2d 663 (1945)
e) U. S. v GRIFFITH 334 US 100, 92 L Ed 1236 (1947)
f) AMERICAN TOBACCO v U.S. 328 US 780, 90 L Ed 2d 1575 (1945)
g) PETO v HOWELL 101 F 2d 23 (1939)
h) UNITED SHOE MACH. CORP. v U.S. 374 US 521, 98 L Ed 910 (1953)
i) HILAND DAIRY v KROGER 402 F 2d 968 (1968)


Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 15

STARK BROS. v STARK 255 us 31, J. Holmes op. on damages under §15
CLARK OIL CO. v PHILLIPS PETRO. 148 F 2d 580 (1945)
ANTITRUST - TREBLE DAMAGEs - 16 ALR Fed. Pg. 14-69, [Lost investment]
PUNITIVE or EXEMPLARY DAMAGES RECOVERABLE, 47 ALR 2d 1118
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES - - [42 USC 1983] Regarding standards for determ. injuries. Case - PATON v LA PRADE n. 15, 524 F 2d 862 (1975)
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from n 102-114, n 185-206, 522

Sherman/Clayton Act: Title 15 U.S.C. Section 24

U. S. v WISE 370 US 405, 8 L Ed 2d 590 (1962)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

a) BUSHIE v STENOCORD No. 25536 (1972)
b) Asso. Press v U.S. 327 US 1-60 (1944)
c) MOORE v MATTHEWS No. 71-2186 (1972)

CASES INVOLVING THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

a) CHRIS BURTON v USOC No. 83-3088
b) MARTIN v I.O.C. 740 F 2d 670 (1985)
c) Stop The Olympic Prison v USOC


INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Protection of Industrial Property - - Convention of 1925
TRADEMARK AND COMMERCIAL PROTECTION - - Convention of 1929
Selected International Conventions - - Important regarding litigation.

PRINCIPALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Federal Rules Decisions

a) FINANCIAL SECURITIES LIT. v PENN MART REAL. 74 FRD 497 (1975)
b) SHERMAN PARK COMM. ASSO. v WAUWATOSA 486 F Supp 838 (1980)
c) HOCKLEY v ZENT 89 FRD 26 (1980)
d) ROESBERG v JOHNS MANVILLE CORP 85 FRD 292 (1980)
e) WEINER v STUART 76 FRD 624 (1977)

TREATISES with regard to CONGRESS

LOBBYING: A Constitutionally Protected Right
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 PL 79-601

CONGRESS AND LAW MAKING, Researching the Legislative Process
By: Robert Goehlert. Clio Books

CAPITOL HILL MANUAL - - Frank Cummings

THE SUPREME COURT - - 1965 TERM - - Archibald Cox

TREATISES/TEXT BOOKS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - - AM JUR 2d, Volume 16-17, §§ 150-826

CONTROLLING TRIAL PUBLICITY - - 1 AM JUR TRIALS, 305-355
MOTION PICTURES AS EVIDENCE [Videos] - - AM JUR 8, 153-173
MONOPOLIES 54 AM JUR 2d, § 463-479, § 696-715, § 812-850
EVIDENCE - - 19 AM JUR 2d §§ 159-174, Presumptions & Inferences
OPENING STATEMENTS [Plaintiff & defendant] 5 AM JUR TRIALS, 285-329.
COMPARATOR FRCP & comparison to state rules.


DISCOVERY

HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Discovery] - - Vol. 74, 940-1046 (1960)
YALE LAW REVIEW [Discovery] - - Vol. 71, (1962) 371-436
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS [Plaintiff] - - 4 AM JUR TRIALS, 186-209
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF RULE 26 [Discovery] pg. 1.211-3.108
TRADEMARK/UNFAIR COMPETITION - - treatises
TM Infringement/Unfair Competition Laws - - 8 AM JUR TRIALS, 363-482
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY REVIEWS - - 2 AM JUR 2d, § 653-711
GOVERNMENTAL *IMMUNITY OF EXEMP FROM ANTI-TRUST LAWS
12 ALR FED., 329-359.
WHITTEN v PADDOCK, [*Immunity] Columbia Law Review. Vol 71, 140-156
CALLMAN UNFAIR COMPETITION - - p. 94-105
ANTI-TRUST - TREBLE DAMAGES - 16 ALR Fed. 14-69, [Lost investment]

The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix D

APPENDIX D

LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED COMPLAINT

Jurisdiction:

This action arises under the Constitution of the United States: Article I, Section 8, Clause 3; Article IV, Section 1 and 2; the First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment; 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq.; and upon jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1138(b), and 15 U.S.C. Section 2 and 15.

Cause of Action:

They threatened to sue any users of Olympic which included me and also stopped me from getting a federal registered trademark for my company name and corporation. I took an affirmative position and sued them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OFFENSES

I. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Non-enforcement/selective enforcement

II. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Right to Contract

III. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Pursue Chosen Profession

IV. First Amendment: Freedom from Prior Restraint.

V. 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amends. Over breadth of Legislation

VI. Article IV, §1. Full Faith and Credit Denied

VII. Article IV, §2. Property rights in Stock, and trademark.

VIII. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection

IX. Fourteenth Amendment: Privileges and Immunities

X. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Denial of valid Copyrights

XI. Tenth Amendment: Persons and States rights.

XII. Ninth Amendment: Privacy and Reputation

XIII. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Illegal Trademark registration

XIV. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Unfair Use of Trademark

XV. 15 U.S.C. §2, Sherman Act. Attempted Monopoly

XVI. Article I, §8, clause 3. Attempt to Regulate Int. Commerce.

XVII. 15 U.S.C. §15, Clayton Act Interference with right to trade or exist


Cases Argued and Cited

Fourteenth Amendment: Selective enforcement

Yick Wo v Hopkins, (1886) 118 US 356, 359; 30 L Ed 220, 227; 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070 the court stated,"If a law is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons of similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal protection is within the prohibitions of the Constitution. Louisville Gas & Electric v Coleman, (1928) 277 US 32, 37; 48 S. CT. 423, the Court said, "The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means that rights of all persons must rest on the same rule under similar circumstances, and applies to the exercise of all the powers of the state which can affect the individual or his property." Distinguished in Frost v Corp. Comm. of OK, (1929) 278 US 515, 522; 49 S. Ct. 235. In Frost, the Court stated that it has "several times decided that a corporation is as much entitled to the equal protection of laws as an individual. The converse is equally true. A classification which is bad because it arbitrarily favors the individual as against the corporation certainly cannot be good when it favors the corporation as against the individual. In either case, the classification, in order to be valid, must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all person similarly situated shall be treated alike."

The state of California acted upon the USOC's instructions to selectively enforce section 380 against their citizens, including this citizen, even when defendant cannot gain this enforcement assistance and support for section 380 in any other leading commercial state in the country nor in Colorado, the state of incorporation of the defendant.

In Shelly v Kraemer, (1948) 334 US 1; 22 S. Ct. 836, the Court stated, "The Constitution confers upon no individual person the right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of he laws to other individuals.

The defendant USOC has no right or authority to request the state of California, or any other state or agency to deny equal protection of the law to the plaintiff or any other similarly situated person.

Fifth Amendment: Selective enforcement and Due Process

In Johnson v Robison, (1974) 415 US 316, 365; 94 S. Ct. 1160, the Court said, "If a classification would be valid under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." In USDA v Moreno, (1973) 413 US 528; 93 S Ct. 2821, the Court stated, "Under the equal protection analysis a legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."

There can be no rational basis for the distinction drawn between natural and artificial persons in California nor any rational basis for the distinction drawn between California businesses and businesses using olympic in 46 other states.

First Amendment: Prior Restraint

In Freedman v Maryland, (1965) 380 US 51, 57; 85 S. CT. 734 It was stated by the Court, "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."

36 U.SC. §380 provides that the defendant has licensing control over use of the word olympic. There will have to be reasonable and definite standard by which the defendant could "rent" the word olympic without the accompanying olympic designations. There can be no reasonable and definite standard made out as to "rent" the word olympic, nor can the word be diluted as the defendant suggests because there must be exclusivity in order for there to be dilution and there is no exclusivity. Vagueness in the system of licensing is established by his "lack of reasonable and definite standard" to use olympic as a guide for renting the word olympic.

In Interstate Circuit v Dallas, (1968) 390 US 676; 88 S. Ct. 12 the Court concluded that "the absence narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for officials to follow [in licensing] is fatal. In Huntley v Public Utilities Commission, (1968) 442 P 2d 685, 688, the California Supreme Court sitting en banc stated, " Improper restraints on communication may vary in form and degree, but all have effect of restricting the dissemination of ideas. The clearest abuse is an "outright prohibition" of a constitutionally protected form of speech. Regulation short of "absolute prohibition" is also invalid when expression is made dependent on state approval by the obtaining of a permit, or is conditioned upon obtaining approval of a board of censors."

The USOC states that permission must be granted to use olympic but it remains to be discovered whether the defendant has ever rented the word to anyone without an accompanying olympic designation. It also remains to be discovered what reasonable and definite standard the defendant uses to determine who can and who cannot use olympic, how much it would cost, restrictions and limitations upon its use, duration of use, as well as other considerations, separate from an olympic trademarked designation.

"No one has the constitutional right to interfere with, restrain or coerce another in the exercise of the same right . . ." NRLB v Continental Oil, distinguishing NRLB v Link Belt Co., (1940) 311 US 584, 598; 61 S. Ct. 358.

The plaintiff claims the right to use olympic under the First Amendment provision which provides that persons are to be free from a prior restraint on the use of a spoken word.

Delegation of Licensing Power to a Private Corporation

"In our view the delegation by the Legislature (NY) of its licensing power to the Jockey Club, a private corporation, is such an abdication as to be patently an unconstitutional relinquishment of legislative power in violation of section 1 of Article III of the constitution of this state (NY) which provides: The legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and the Assembly." Fink v Cole, (1951) 97 NE 2d 873, 876; 302 NY 216.

This is analogous to the provisions of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution in that Congress may not delegate powers to any person which in effect, or in fact, create the illusion of Federally granted power to license [olympic] over the entire field of commercial enterprise or endeavor. The legislative history of 36 U.S.C. § 371 et seq. bears a recital. These games have 'only' to do with amateur athletics. The defendant assumes the position as proprietor of the word olympic over the entire filed of commercial endeavor. This is grossly incompatible with the legislative history as defined by Senate Report No. 2523 regarding the Amateur Act.

COMMERCE CLAUSE - Article I, Section 8, Clause 3

"Activities that are beyond the reach of Congress under the commerce power are those which are completely within the particular state, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some general powers of government." Katzenback v McClung, 379 US 294; 85 S. Ct. 377.

"Authority of Federal government over interstate commerce may not be pushed to such extremes as to destroy the distinction between commerce among the several states and internal concerns of [the] state." NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel, (1937) 301 US 1; 57 S. Ct. 615.

The statue under attack makes no distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce, and it may well be true that most olympic businesses throughout the U.S. may be small, locally owned, intrastate businesses. Congress has no grant of power over the states in regard to purely intrastate business unless it substantially effects interstate commerce.

Right of Olympic Records, Inc. to Interstate Commerce

"The state cannot exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce . . ." Horn Silver Mining v New York, (1892) 143 US 305; 12 S. Ct. 403. "A corporation from one state may go into another without leave of license of the latter for all legitimate purposes of interstate commerce, and any statute of the latter state which obstructs or lays burden on the exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution." Western Union v Kansas, (1910) 216 US 1; 30 S. Ct. 190. Pullman Co. v Kansas, (1910) 216 US 56; 30 S. Ct. 232. "Right to engage in interstate commerce is not a gift of the state and it cannot be restrained or regulated by the state, nor cab the state exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in such commerce." "It follows that under the commerce clause [a] corporation authorized by the state of its creation to engage in interstate commerce may not be prevented by another state from coming into its limits for all legitimate purposes of such commerce . . ." Sioux Remedy v Cope, (1914) 235 US 197; 35 S. Ct. 57.

"State has authority to control doing business within the state by foreign corporations but it is without power to use its lawful authority to exclude foreign corporations by directly burdening interstate commerce, as a condition of permitting them to do business within the state, in violation of he Federal Constitution." Looney v Crane Co, (1917) 245 US 178; 38 S. Ct. 85.

The state of California burdens interstate commerce by refusing Olympic Records, Inc. the right and ability to do business in the state.

Invalid Trademark Registration No. 968,566

In the case of G. & C. Merriam v Saalfield, (1912) 198 F 369 a Public Right doctrine was stated by the court, "Primarily, it would seem that one might appropriate to himself for his goods any words or phrase that he chose; but this is not so, because the broader Public Right prevails, and one may not appropriate to his own exclusive use a word which already belongs to the Public and so may be used by any one of the Public."

In Delaware Canal v Clark, (1871) 13 Wall. 311, 323; 20 L Ed 581, 583, the court held, "No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade name or trademark which would give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other than those produced by himself. If he could the Public would be injured, for competition would be destroyed." Distinguished in Standard Paint v Trinidad Asphalt, (1911) 220 US 446, 453; 36 S. Ct. 456. Also stated in Delaware, "There is no moral or legal wrong in the adoption or imitation of what is claimed by another as a trademark if it is just as true in it's application to the goods of the second adopter as to those of the first."

In United Drug v Theodore Rectanus, (1918) 248 US 90, 98; 39 S. Ct. 90, the Court held, "The owner of a trademark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly." Distinguished in American Steel v Robertson, (1925) 269 US 372, 380; 70 L Ed 317, 320, in American the Court further stated, "The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does not prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on articles of different description."

"No damages shall be recovered by a party failing to give notice of registration exception proof that the plaintiff or defendant was duly notified of the infringement and continued the same after notice." Stark Bros. v Stark (1920) 255 US 50; 41 S. Ct. 221. 15 USC §1111 provides the same authority as Stark. The defendant was precluded from using the notice provision provided for by 15 USC §1111.

DISCRIMINATORY USE OF TRADEMARK - Registration no. 980, 734

This trademark was used by the defendant on a letter sent to all the 50 States during 1978 requesting the selective enforcement of section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act. [Exh. 231] Regarding the plaintiff's torch: In Corning v Pasmantier, 30 Supp 477,480 (1939), the court made a visual comparison of the torch trademarks and found the question of infringement rested on a visual comparison of the marks.

The plaintiff has no registration for a torch though one is pending. The defendant has a torch in registration no. 980,734 but this torch is not mentioned or described in any way, thus neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have a registration for a torch and a visual comparison of the torches is a good test for infringement. Plaintiff used a pre-existing torch as a model from which his torch was derived. The model was not the olympic torch.

ATTEMPTED MONOPOLY - Sherman Act §2

"A monopoly in the United States created by contract or agreement with foreign corporations is unlawful." U.S. v American Tobacco, (1911) 221 US 106; 31 S. Ct. 632. distinguished in Bausch Machine v Aluminum Co., (2nd Circuit, 1934).

In Peto v Howell 101 F 2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1938), a classic explanation of a monopoly was states by the court, Monopoly is the acquisition of something for one's own self, not necessarily the whole of a given commodity or the whole commerce therein but control, at least, of a part thereof sufficient to constitute withholding from the public the right to deal therein in an open market." The source for this authority lies in U.S. v Keystone Watch, (D.C. PA 1915; 218 F 502. This court distinguishing Standard Oil v U.S., 221 U.S. 1; 31 S. Ct. 502, 516, stated, "Congress, in speaking of monopolies of any part of interstate commerce, must have had in mind such restraints of such part of that commerce as bring about an extraordinary control of any part of the commodities in the stream of commerce . . . the court added, The words 'to monopolize,' and 'monopolize' as used in this section [§2] reach every act bringing about the prohibited results."

"It is not of importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful . . . American Tobacco v U.S. (1945) 328 U.S. 781, 809; 66 S. Ct. 1125.

In U.S v Griffith (1948) 334 US 100, 105; 68 S. Ct. 941, the Court stated, "It is, however, not always necessary to find specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the antitrust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that the restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequences of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements." Id. L Ed at 1243, "So it is that monopoly power,whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under section 2 . . . for section 2 of the Act is aimed at the acquisition or retention of effective market control." The court continued, "Hence the existence of power 'to exclude competition when it is desired to do so' is in itself a violation of section 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power." See, American Tobacco v U.S., SUPRA. The antitrust laws are as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction."

In U.S. v Grinnel Corp., (1966) 384 US 563, 570, 571; 86 S. Ct 1698, the Court said, "The offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power . . . Id. at L Ed 2d 787, "we [the Court] see no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where that combination reflects commercial realities."

In regard to (1) defendant's control over commerce in the United states, pursuant to section 380, indicates that the relevant market [of the defendant] as being the entire field commercial products and services and (2) here is no question as to the willful maintenance of the power of section 380.

In Hiland Dairy v Kroger (8th Cir. 1968) 402 F 2d 968, 971, the court stated, "Under the section 2 [Sherman Act] the attempt to monopolize must be 'likely to accomplish' monopolization, Kansas City Star v U.S., 240 F 2D 643, 663 (8th Cir. 1957), or afford a 'dangerous probability of monopolization." Also stated, "The specific intent necessary to support an attempted monopolization under section 2 must be shown by the conduct or acts from which a wrongful intent can be inferred."

DAMAGES UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 15

In Clark Oil v Phillips Petro, 148 F2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945), the court stated its explanation of damages under the antitrust statutes. "The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act afford a cause of action for those suffering damages. In their provisions for damages hey embody both punitive and compensatory damages but no recovery can be had unless a case for compensatory damages is made. In the event of compensatory damages, the automatically punitive damages follow." In Clark, supra F 2d at 583, "[A]n action to recover treble damages under the Clayton Act is based upon tort and is not fixed by statutory provisions, but the damages are unliquidated."
15 U.S.C. § 24

The purpose and intent of 15 U.S.C. § 24 was analyzed in the case of U.S v Wise, (1962) 370 US 405, 413, 414; 82 S. Ct. 1354, in which the Court discussed its analysis regarding eh definition f he word "persons" as used in the antitrust laws not meant to exclude corporate officers and directors by stating, "The reasons for section 14 [Clayton Act] are sufficiently revealed by the legislative history . . . The reports provide no assistance but the debates do . ."[§14] is merely a reenactment of the Sherman law, sections 1, 2, and 3. It has always been held that the officers of corporations violating the law wee punishable under these sections."

The plaintiff holds that the 'artificial person' of the defendant [Federally Chartered Corporation] is only capable of injuring another person through a natural person, e.g., an officer, director, or authorized agent.

THE LANHAM ACT APPLIES TO 36 U.S.C. §371 et. seq.

In the amending of 36 U.S.C. § 371 et. seq. (1950) into the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, a provision was added to apply the rights and remedies available under the Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act] to all existing rights and privileges encompassed in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. In the defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p.8 line 11, "As regards is constitutionality, section 380 presents no different issue that traditional trademarks and the right to exclusive use of the words comprising the mark that trademark law grants to the holder."

In the treatise on trademarks by Dubroff & Seidel, Trademark Law and Practice, §1:06 declaring the general principals regarding trademarks, "It must be of such a nature as to permit exclusive appropriation by one person . . . [U]nless the trademark performs its proper function, neither can the first adopter be injured by appropriation or imitation of it [TM] by others, nor can the public be deceived."

Olympic has not been exclusively appropriated by the defendant, whether rights exist to that effect, or not. It is important to note that olympic cannot be appropriated by any person, not even the defendant, and at this time the only way to exclusively appropriate olympic wold be to take it away from all other persons who have various rights and titles thereto, an impossible accomplishment.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that judgment be had against the defendant as demanded in his First Amended Complaint.

The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix C

APPENDIX C

FEDERAL COURT RECORD

TABLE OF EVIDENCE Case No. CV 85 481 RG, Central District CA
Clerk's record. Leo Oliver LaBranche Jr. v. USOC (A corporation)

Declaration of authenticity of television broadcast.
Exhibit 1, P.T.O. refusal.
Exhibits 3-6, C.B.S. broadcast transcript
Exhibits 7-10, Legal Trade Publication.
Exhibits 11, 16-26 assorted corporations, permits & licenses.
Exhibits 27-31, New York Certificates. [Good Standing]
Exhibits 32-36, Minnesota Certificates.
Exhibits 37, 38, Indiana Certificates.
Exhibits 39-48, Wisconsin Certificates.
Exhibits 49-60, North Carolina Certificates.
Exhibits 61-65, Ohio Certificates.
Exhibits 66-69, Illinois Certificates.
Exhibits 70-72, Florida Certificates.
Exhibits 73-75, Georgia Certificates.
Exhibits 76-80, Maryland Certificates.
Exhibits 81-89, Texas Certificates.
Exhibits 90-94, Virginia Certificates.
Exhibits 95-97, Rhode Island.
Exhibits 98-101, Arizona Certificates.
Exhibits 102-105, Nebraska Certificates.
Exhibits 106-110, Oklahoma Certificates.
Exhibits 111-116, COLORADO Certificates-USOC home state.
Exhibits 141-153, Policy of states of NY, MN, MA, OH, IL, IA, TX, RI, AZ, NE, SC, OK, WA
Exhibits 154-158, New York list from tax board.
Exhibits 159-172, California computer print-out.
Exhibits 197-199, Ohio computer print-out.
Exhibits 200-203, Florida computer print-out.
Exhibits 204, 205, Maryland reply w/list.
Exhibits 206, South Carolina letter reply.
Exhibits 224-227, Pennsylvania computer print-out.
Exhibits 228, 229, New Mexico computer print-out.

Exhibits 230-232, Certified letter sent by USOC to all states during 1978.
Exhibits 233, Interstate Commerce Commission computer p/o.
Exhibits 237, Important letter reply from U.S. Copyright Office.
Exhibits 249, 250, F.S.L.I.C. computer print-out.
Exhibits 251-252, various refusals from Florida, Georgia,
Alabama, Michigan, and California.
Exhibits 256-258, Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq..
Exhibits 297-300, Massachusetts corporations, list of contents.
Exhibits 521, 522, Microfiche No. 26 & 27 received from State of WA
Exhibits 523, 526, Compilation from microfiche.

These exhibits are a small percentage of the number of businesses and corporations throughout the United States.

End : Table of contents of bound exhibits.

The OLYMPIC RECORD Appendix B

APPENDIX B

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

U.S. District Court
Central District of California
Case CV 85 481 RG

LABRANCHE v USOC

PLAINTIFF COMPLAINS AGAINST DEFENDANT AND FOR A FIRST CLAIM OF RELIEF ALLEGES:

JURISDICTION:

Federal questions and the amount in Controversy exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars. Actions arises under the Constitution of the United States: Article I, Section 8-clause 3; Article IV section 1 & 2; The First Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the 9th and 10th Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; and upon jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1338(b), and 15 U.S.C. sections 2 and 15 as more fully hereinafter appears.

CAUSE OF ACTION

1. On April 26, 1984 the plaintiff was refused the right to register his trademark and design by the P.T.O. pursuant to the section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.
2. On August 1, 1984 a C.B.S. network broadcast titled, "Crossroads" aired and was viewed by the plaintiff, during which the defendant made statements to the effect that, "anyone using the word olympic after 1950 was violating the Act and would be litigated by the defendant.
3. Article in legal trade publication, "Los Angeles Lawyer" (July issue), repeats threat of litigation to all unauthorized users of the word Olympic.
4. An investment of more than $100,000 has been used for the formation and foundation of of plaintiff's business and that is jeopardized by the defendant's statements and threats.
5. Plaintiff formed the New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., January 5, 1983 and that entity and its stock owned by the plaintiff is denied full faith and credit and put in jeopardy by the defendant and section 380 of the Act.
6. Plaintiff formed his business on September 15, 1982 and has legally acquired and obtained all licenses and permits necessary to conduct his business and these licenses and permits are denied credit pursuant to the defendant and section 380 of the Act.

TABLE OF CONTENTS - - CHARGES AND OFFENSES

I. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Non-enforcement/selective enforcement
II. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Right to Contract
III. Fifth Amendment: Due Process Pursue Business of Chosen Profession
IV. First Amendment: Freedom from Prior Restraint
V. 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amends. Over breadth of Legislation
VI. Article IV, §1. Full Faith and Credit Denied
VII. Article IV, §2. Property rights in Stock, and trademark
VIII. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
IX. Fourteenth Amendment: Privileges and Immunities
X. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Denial of valid Copyrights
XI. Tenth Amendment: Persons and States rights.
XII. Ninth Amendment: Privacy and Reputation
XIII. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Illegal Trademark registration
XIV. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. Unfair Use of Trademark
XV. 15 U.S.C. §2, Sherman Act. Attempted Monopoly
XVI. Article I, §8, clause 3. Attempt to Regulate Interstate Comm.
XVII. 15 U.S.C. §15, Clayton Act. Interference with right to trade and exist

COUNT NO. 1
1). Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act is being selectively enforced or not enforced at all in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2). Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act remained dormant for 28 to 30 years in violation of Plaintiff claims section 380 of the Amateur Act.
3). Plaintiff claims, and provides proof, of non-enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act by the following Federal Agencies:
(a) Internal revenue Service (b) Interstate Commerce Commission (c) Copyright Office (d)Comptroller of the Currency (e) Securities and Exchange Commission (f) F.D.I.C. (g) F.S.L.I.C. in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
4). Plaintiff claims non-enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act in the following states: NY, MN, IN, WI, NC, OH, IL, FL, GA, MA, TX, VA, RI, AZ, NE, SC. OK, and WA in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
5). Plaintiff claims selective enforcement of §380 of the Amateur Act in the following states: AL, MI, CA in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT NO. 2
Liberty to Contract

6). Plaintiff claims his liberty to contract is prohibited pursuant to §380 of the Amateur Act in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT NO. 3
Pursue Chosen Profession

7). Plaintiff claims his "right to pursue the business of his chosen profession" is denied by Plaintiff claims in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

COUNT NO. 4
Prior Restraint of Free Speech

8). Plaintiff claims §380 of the Amateur Act and the defendant require that permission be obtained for use of a "a spoken word" which is an illegal exercise in "prior restraint" in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment.
COUNT NO. 5
Overbreadth of Legislation

9). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is unconstitutionally broad because it is susceptible of application to the plaintiff's conduct which is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
10). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is "invalid as applied" because it is not capable of being enforced against all alike under the same circumstances, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
11). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is "invalid as not applied" because the Amateur Act is not enforced by Federal Agencies (except the PTO) and not enforced by 46 +/- 2 states in violation of the plaintiff's rights.

COUNT NO. 6
Full Faith and Credit

12). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to permits and licenses legally acquired in the state of California, in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Full Faith and Credit provision of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution.
13). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to the New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Full Faith and Credit provision of Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.
14). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies credit to corporations, businesses, and copyright holders included as evidence in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated" guaranteed by Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 7
Violation of Article IV, Section 2

15). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the right to own or sell stock in the legally formed New York corporation, Olympic Records, Inc., in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and further guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
16). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the right to design, own, and register a trademark and design in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.

17). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act denies the plaintiff's business the right to exist in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 8
Equal Protection of Laws

18). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, violates the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
19). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act is explicit in its prohibitions and as such reach and include all persons in the state of California, with no exceptions, and the state only selectively prohibits corporations using the word olympic and has no enforcement policy regarding any and all others, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20). Plaintiff claims that the State Board of Equalization allows foreign corporations with olympic as apart of their corporate name to obtain a sales Tax resale license issued by the state of California, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated," guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21). Plaintiff claims that that the state of California denies corporate protection (umbrella) for its legally formed businesses using the word olympic, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and those "similarly situated," guaranteed by the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 9
Privileges & Immunities

22). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, forbids persons to incorporate in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
23). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California does not treat all person "similarly situated" alike in regard to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
24). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, denies plaintiff's right to form a corporation, own stock, design and own a trademark or obtain a foreign corporation license, in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by virtue of National Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
25). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, denies plaintiff's "right to protect his business, property, trademark, and his investment of time, effort, and capital in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by virtue of National Citizenship and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the Constitution.
26). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act, selectively enforced by the state of California, "authorizes" the state to violate the Equal Protection provision and the Privileges and Immunity provision of the 14th Amendment.

COUNT NO. 10
Violation of 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8

27). Plaintiff claims that the federal law and the defendant deny credit and validity to U. S. Copyrights owned or held by the plaintiff in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §102(2)(5)(7) and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
28). Plaintiff claims that Copyright registration number SR 49-369 and VA 137-790, owned by the plaintiff, are denied credit and validity by § 380 of the Amateur Act and by the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §106(1-3) and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.
29). Plaintiff claims that the federal law and the defendant deny credit to ALL copyrights legally issued by the Register of Copyrights to the plaintiff and over five hundred (500) others "similarly situated" in violation of the plaintiff's rights guaranteed by 17 U.S.C. §101 et seq. and further guaranteed by Article I, §8, clause 8 of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 11
Violation of the Tenth Amendment

30). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act has been ignored, taken exception to, avoided, or otherwise rejected by state officers, state attorneys, state tax boards, and state corporation commissions; and plaintiff claims, and proves in evidence, that 46 +/- 2 of the states have chosen not to violate the rights of their citizens even though the Amateur Act gives (illegal) authority to do so, and consequently §380 of the Amateur Act is in violation of the plaintiff's and the states' rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.
31). Plaintiff claims that §380 of the Amateur Act enacted by Congress is defective as applied, and as not applied,and plaintiff claims the Act was brought to the attention of the states in 1978 which plaintiff claims is 28 years too late for the Act to have any effect except an unconstitutional one, and this dormancy of the Act violates plaintiff's and states' rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 12
Violation of the 9th Amendment

32). Plaintiff claims that the defendant and §380 of the Amateur Act are denying plaintiff's right to privacy by intrusions created by the appearance of the defendant on August 1, 1984 network television broadcast during which the defendant 'warned' the general public that all businesses or person using the word Olympic without their permission was violating the Amateur Act and would be litigated by the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's rights under the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
33). Plaintiff claims that the defendant in the act of supporting the Amateur Act by appearing on network television has blatantly, obnoxiously, unwarrantedly, and with reckless disregard, attacked the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," in violation of the plaintiff's right of Privacy and Reputation guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 13
Illegal Trademark Registration - the word Olympic

34). Plaintiff claims that trademark registration number 968,566 (trademark/servicemark/collective membership mark- the word olympic) owned and used by the defendant is in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) because the defendant has no control over use of the mark and for all practical purposes the mark has been abandoned to the public (who always owned it) in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946 [15 U.S.C. 1064 (c)] and the plaintiff's rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
35). Plaintiff claims this registered trademark has been used, and is being used, to further an attempt to partially monopolize using this illegal and invalid registration by attempting to preclude all others from registering any mark in any class of goods using the word olympic, and this mark has been used for and as unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) and violates plaintiff's right to be afforded protection of a Registration on the Principal Register of the P.T.O..
36). Plaintiff claims hat this registration was obtained and issued in error because the year the registration was issued (1971) there were, and still are, numerous (1000's) of legal businesses and corporations using the word olympic in each of the classes of goods the defendant claims exclusive rights in, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1064 (c) and the plaintiff's rights under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 14
Unfair Use of Trademark 980,734

37). Plaintiff claim's the defendant's mark, registration no. 980,734, has been used for the purposes on unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(7) of the Trademark Act and the plaintiff's right to be admitted on the register of the P.T.O..
38). Plaintiff claims that in 1978 the defendant gave notice to all the states that §380 of Amateur Act was in effect and that each state should now prevent their citizens, and the citizens of other states, from forming corporations using the word olympic, and also requested enforcement assistance (this mark was used on the notice) in violation of plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
39). Plaintiff claims unfair competition regarding this mark because the notice to the states suggests no policy regarding unincorporated businesses, and in effect, discriminates against corporations in violation of the rights of the class (corporations) of which the plaintiff claims membership, guaranteed by the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

COUNT NO. 15
Violation of Sherman Act, section 2

40). Plaintiff re-alleges jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §1338(b), as this and proceeding counts are associated with Counts No. 13 & 14.
41). Plaintiff claims that defendant is attempting to exclude the plaintiff, and others "similarly situated" fro doing legal, unobstructed interstates commerce in the violation of the plaintiff's rights under 15 U.S.C. section 2.
42). Plaintiff claims the defendant has warned the general public, including the plaintiff, that litigation will follow any unauthorized use of the word olympic, which under present circumstances, is "impossible," due to the several thousand legitimate businesses and corporations now in existence, in violation of plaintiff's rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and in violation of the Sherman Act, section 2.
43). Plaintiff claims that the defendant appeared on network television August 1, 1984 to proclaim the Amateur Act and their rights under it, and this appearance was a blatant example of attempted monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, section 2.
44). Plaintiff claims actions of the defendant's part designed to intimidate weaker opponents, while avoiding confrontations with those stronger than the defendant, is an illegal attempt to perpetuate a partial monopoly at the expense of the weaker party or parties, violation of the plaintiff's rights, and the rights of all others similarly situated, under 15 U.S.C. section 2.

COUNT NO. 16
Violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3

45). Plaintiff claims that the defendant is attempting to regulate interstate commerce, in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
46). Plaintiff claims the Amateur Act includes illegal provisions which entitle the defendant to act in a predatory manner, to attempt to regulate legal commercial businesses and corporations in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.
47). Plaintiff claims that the Amateur Act is explicit in its prohibitions, and these prohibitions reach and include all persons, natural and artificial, in the United States, yet the defendant suggests to the states that they only prohibit corporations, in contravention of the Amateur Act itself, which prohibits all person, in violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and all others "similarly situated," guaranteed by Article I, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution.

COUNT NO.17
Violation of 15 U.S.C., Section 15

48). Plaintiff claims that the defendant has illegally interfered with the plaintiff's right to trade, and plaintiff's business the right to exist in violation of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts.

The Olympic Record Appendix A

APPENDIXES


APPENDIX A Pro Se Litigant Information


APPENDIX B FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT


APPENDIX C TOC - EVIDENCE


APPENDIX D LEGAL BRIEF


APPENDIX E CASE LAWS AND STATUTES


APPENDIX F FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE


APPENDIX G PARTIAL LIST OF OLYMPIC BUSINESSES

**************************************

APPENDIX A

PRO SE LITIGANT EXPLANATIONS AND COMMENTS

Had there been an internet what follows would have been compiled and available, and, had I known these statistics there would have come a time of sober, or, not so sober, reflection re being a pre se litigant. As it turned I had no choice so forward went the wagons. With the following information you can determine whether you would want to represent yourself in any court, unless of course, you had no choice (and even then).

Wikipedia Generalizations

Pro se legal representation refers to the instance of a person representing himself or herself, without a lawyer, in a court proceeding, whether as a defendant or a plaintiff and whether the matter is civil or criminal. Pro se is a Latin phrase meaning "for oneself." This status is sometimes known as propria persona (abbreviated to "pro per"). Many state and the federal courts systems are experiencing an increasing proportion of pro se litigants. In the United States federal court system for the year 2007 approximately 27% of actions filed, 92% of prisoner petitions, and 10% of non-prisoner petitions, were filed by pro se litigants. The right of a party to a legal action to represent his or her own cause has long been recognized in the United States, and even predates the ratification of the Constitution. The Supreme Court noted that "[i]n the federal courts the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 signed by President Washington, one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed which provided that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of counsel."

Section 1654 of title 28 of the United States Code provides: "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." Most states have a constitutional provision that either expressly, or by interpretation, allows individuals to represent their own causes in the courts of that state.

Limits

In some situations, self-represented appearances are not allowed. Generally, an owner can represent a solely owned business or partnership, but only a licensed attorney can represent a corporation. The ability of a party to proceed without an attorney in prosecuting or defending a civil action is largely a matter of state law, and may vary depending on the court and the positions of the parties. A longstanding and widely practiced rule prohibits corporations from being represented by non-attorneys, consistent with the existence of a corporation as a "person" separate and distinct from its officers and employees. Few federal court of appeals allow unrepresented litigants to argue, and in all courts the percentage of cases in which argument occurs is higher for counseled cases.
Notable pro se litigants

The pro se defendant in Kolender v. Lawson (461 U.S. 352, 1983), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a police officer could not arrest a citizen merely for refusing to present identification.

Robert Kerns was the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper. He acted as his own lawyer in parts of his long legal battles for patent infringement against Ford and Chrysler. His legal battles are the subject of the 2008 film, Flash of Genius.

Clarence Earl Gideon was too poor to afford an attorney and thus proceeded pro se in his criminal trial in Florida in 1961. He was found guilty and subsequently appealed. He was appointed counsel when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court; the Court ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright that the right to counsel means that states are required to provide counsel free of charge to indigent criminal defendants and that Florida's failure to appoint such counsel in Gideon's case constituted a violation of that right. On remand Gideon was represented in the new trial, and was acquitted.

Brandon Moon spent 17 years in jail for a rape that he did not commit. He was convicted after being picked from a lineup 18 months after the rape in which he was the only blue eyed white man. He was a sophomore in college and a veteran of four years in the air force when he was accused. He was released due to DNA evidence after help from the Innocence Project. He spent his prison years learning about blood tests, eye witness identification and law. Before the Innocence Project became involved, Moon represented himself and repeatedly applied for relief but, according to his lawyer he was "bounced around the courts like a Ping-Pong ball" because "The courts are so hostile to pro se litigants. The instinct is to deny, deny, deny."

Thomas Van Orden, a lawyer with a suspended license to practice law who was living homeless in Austin, Texas managed to challenge a religious display on the state capitol grounds, and successfully navigated his case all the way to the Supreme Court. While he was ultimately unsuccessful at getting the display removed, he was extremely successful at litigating the case.

Anthony Pellicano, a Los Angeles-based private investigator known for working with high-profile entertainment industry attorneys, represented himself in federal district court after being indicted on numerous counts of criminal conspiracy and wiretapping charges. He fired his attorneys prior to trial. He was convicted on all but one count. He also faced a second trial along with co-defendant Terry Christiansen. He again represented himself and again was convicted on numerous counts.

Barbara Schwarz, of Salt Lake City, Utah has filed a large number of Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests. When the responses failed to verify her claims, she responded with litigation, which she has done pro se. At least one of her lawsuits have been considered by a U.S. District or U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals somewhere in the nation every year since 1993."

James Traficant, a former U.S. Representative from Ohio, represented himself in a RICO case in 1983, and was acquitted of all charges, becoming the only person to ever win a RICO case while representing himself. Traficant would represent himself again in 2002, this time unsuccessfully, and was sentenced to prison for 8 years for taking bribes, filing false tax returns, and racketeering.

Lenny Bruce represented himself in a number of obscenity trials, including Chicago Gate of Horn case, People v. Bruce.

Resources

Self-represented litigants may turn to "self-help" assistance. These tend to come from three sources: local courts, which may offer limited self-help assistance; and public interest groups, such as the American Bar Association, which sponsors reform and promotes resources for self-help, and services which sell pre-made forms allowing self-represented parties to have correct documents.

The American Bar Association (ABA) has also been involved with issues related to self-representation. The ABA has awarded a grant in 2008 to the Chicago Kent College of Law Center for Access to Justice & Technology for making justice more accessible to the public through the use of the Internet in teaching, legal practice and public access to the law. Their A2J Author Project is a software tool that empowers those from the courts, legal services programs and educational institutions to create guided interviews resulting in document assembly, electronic filing and data collection. Viewers using A2J to go through a guided interview are led down a virtual pathway to the courthouse. As they answer simple questions about their legal issue, the technology then “translates” the answers to create, or assemble, the documents that are needed for filing with the court.

In representing oneself as Pro Se litigant, access to the WESTLAW database of legal practices and appellate court decisions, will provided valuable information on cause of action and elements of proof outlines for basic Complaint and Summary Judgment filings. Valuable case citations giving guidance in forming interrogative (discovery) questions, by state, are also easily extracted and copied to portable (thumb)drives for inclusion in personal records, or other court work. Free Access to this very costly subscription internet database resource is commonly available in the local law library, and in some locations goes basically unused in the towns main library. Internet access to State and Federal statutes provides useful insight into what is currently considered right or wrong conduct by law enforcement or individuals. Internet access to County, State and Federal public domain databases concerning property tax appraisal records, corporations, trusts and other legal entities can often provide (after diligent searching) much useful information on the policies and practices of the opposing individual and their counsel. Also, numerous examples of common complaint problems or pleadings are found on the internet, along with sometimes helpful videos produced by concerned lawyers.

The Olympic Record Epilogue

EPILOGUE

An Epilogue usually occurs at the end of a story. As you see there is more to follow (Part VIII). For all intents and purposes this Olympic record had ended, though incomplete.

Telling the story would have been different (if at all) had I Googled the Amateur Sports Act in January, 2010. I now know why it was an unconscious decision and on forced reflection, I admit I didn't want to know, one way or the other. I knew everyone was free because Olympic businesses and Olympics of every description are widespread throughout the Country, more prevalent now than back during my court time and there were many thousands then.

So, if the law was changed - then great, I was right and I'm just as screwed as ever. [Vindication and a dollar will get you a bottled water.] However if the law was not changed then my beliefs about my efforts (4 years) and effectiveness (which had somewhat sustained me) would have been shattered. Impotence by retrospect. Believing you made a difference and then finding out you didn't.

When confronted by the question, "When did this event (if any) occur which freed the Olympic slaves, so to speak?" Then I had to click the google search button. That was March 15. Congress finally saw fit to change the law in 1998 and when it was amended and reenacted it had the much needed, and litigated for, and lobbied for, "change." Utilizing the word "permitted" as opposed to the word "prohibited." Pertinent part below in Bold.

Excerpt from "Ted Stevens, Amateur Sports Act." (1998)
See, ** connecting to ***.

(c) CIVIL ACTION FOR UNAUTHORIZED USE.—Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the corporation may file a civil action against a person for the remedies provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.) (popularly known as the Trademark Act of 1946) if the person, without the consent of the corporation, uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition—
(1) the symbol described in subsection (a)(2) of this section;
(2) the emblem described in subsection (a)(3) of this section;
**(3) the words described in subsection (a)(4) of this section, or any combination or simulation of those words [including OLYMPIC] tending to cause confusion or mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the corporation or any Olympic, Paralympic, or Pan-American Games activity; or
(d) PRE-EXISTING AND GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE RIGHTS.—

(1) A person who actually used the emblem described in subsection (a)(3) of this section, or the words or any combination of the words described in subsection (a)(4) of this section, for any lawful purpose before September 21, 1950, is not prohibited by this section from continuing the lawful use for the same purpose and for the same goods or services.
(2) A person who actually used, or whose assignor actually used, the words or any combination of the words described in subsection (a)(4) of this section, or a trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsection (c)(4) of this section, for any lawful purpose before September 21, 1950, is not prohibited by this section from continuing the lawful use for the same purpose and for the same goods or services.

*** (3) Use of the word “Olympic” to identify a business or goods or services is permitted by this section where—

(A) such use is not combined with any of the intellectual properties referenced in subsections (a) or (c) of this section;

This story (the Pro Se parts) has added dimension with the "Ted Stevens - Amateur Sports Act" as ultimate conclusion and proof. Thirteen years after ordered by a federal court to destroy my business and stop lobbying using the word Olympic it finally comes to pass, actually in legislative print. Freedom for all except me though I knew that. There's a saying I've heard, "you can do good things as long as you don't need credit."

The law was amended in 1998 with NO MENTION of the minor changes as above highlighted. The minor change of prohibited to permitted, a very large leap. Thirteen years later Congress changes the Amateur Sports Act in harmony with my Complaint, Petitions, and requests. Go back to the latter part of Chapter 21. See the re-write of §380.

My Congressional Petitions are Public record and show when it was lodged with the Congress and referred by the Speaker (O'Neil) to the Judiciary Committees of both Houses (Thurmond & Rodino). These Public records, noted in the Congressional Record, given a number, involving committee Chairmen - my actions truly becoming the "country's business," for a moment possibly. In late 1985 I was contacted and assured by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Amateur Sports Act was to be corrected or clarified sometime in the near future. In the preceding chapters I commented on feeling relief for a few days when hearing that possibility. Thirteen years later Ted's Amateur Act appears and twelve years after that I come upon it. I guess this is closure.

At minimum this Olympic Record [Pro Se Litigant] reflects what can occur when you are right, truthful, follow the rules, do due diligence, invest capital, and stand up for your rights. A typical American story where only the whistle-blower, martyr, and pariah rides, or is carried off, into the sunset never to be heard from again. Chalk up another one for Don Coyote in the mountains of Colorado in search of his personal and possible dream.

Fine

At this time Parts I, II, and VIII are not posted. They are music based and autobiographical.

The Olympic Record Blog 6

Chapter 28

A Case of Linguistic Theft
Published in the New Yorker, August 24th, 1987
Hon. Gerry E. Studds of Massachusetts on the House floor. September 29, 1987.

Mr. Studds: Mr. Speaker, sometimes, legislation which seems routine turns out to have consequences that are anything but routine. I doubt very much, for example, that when we passed the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 we contemplated either a frontal assault on the first amendment or a highly personal assault against one of our citizens. Yet we seem to have been a party to both. The following essay from the New Yorker tells a story that ought to give us all pause. It is very hard for me to believe this is what we intended.

(New Yorker, Aug. 24, 1987)
Notes and Comment
Edited for Content

Peter Weiss is a trademark lawyer here in New York. He has defended, among many others, the appellations of Superman, Chanel, and Ultrasuede against those who would make free with them. We called him up last week to talk about the Supreme Court's decision in June that the United States Olympic Committee had the right, under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, exclusive domain, for the purposes of public identification and promotion over the word "Olympics." The decision came in a case called San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., and Thomas Waddell v. United States Olympic Committee in which the USOC sought to enjoin the defendants from using the name Gay Olympics in promoting an event ultimately called the Gay Games. (The games were held in San Francisco in 1982 and again last year.) Mr. Weiss became involved in the matter as an informal consultant on the side of the San Francisco group. We wanted to talk to him because of a lingering feeling we had that there was something extremely peculiar about removing a general, ancient, and, indeed, religious word from our language and "awarding" it, even if only for certain purposes, to some committee. The people on the side of the Gay Olympics claimed that their right to use the word was protected by the First Amendment. They also argued that the USOC had acted discriminatorily, having allowed the International Police Olympics, the Special Olympics, the K-9 Olympics, and the Senior Olympics (to say nothing of the Rat Olympics, the Armenian Olympics, and the Eskimo Olympics) to go unscathed while relentlessly pursuing the homosexuals who had gathered in San Francisco for a week of athletic and cultural activities. Mr. Weiss vastly strengthened our impression that the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 and the Supreme Court decision upholding its Constitutionality amounted to a linguistic theft, and that the decision was kind of crazy in its details.
"It's preposterous - a genuine howler of an error," he told us. "The USOC got its power over the word directly from Congress, so obviously the action the USOC takes with regard to this so-called trademark is the equivalent of state action. It's also pretty obvious that the USOC has acted in a discriminatory way in this case. Furthermore, the court upheld a statute that didn't even allow SFAA the traditional defense in such cases - that there was no likelihood of confusion, that no one would have associated the Gay Olympics with anything the USOC might sponsor. And it's not straining at all to think of the name Gay Olympics as political speech and therefore protected by the First Amendment: the group involved was trying to make a political point against stereotyping homosexuals as being un-athletic. And, by the way, there was a dissenting opinion that made the point very strongly when the case was denied by the full Ninth Circuit Court, and the Judge that wrote the dissent is generally regarded as an "ultraconservative."
We asked Mr. Weiss what sort of precedent this decision might set. "Terrible," he said. Say the association of International Marathons went to Congress and pointed out that many marathons were bringing in people from all over the world and a lot of money, and that the whole thing needed to be regulated, and so forth, and they asked for trademark rights to the word "marathon." It would be a very similar set of circumstances and a perfectly logical development. If Congress passed such a law, and the President signed it, that would mean that the association could dole out the word to whatever events it deemed worthy and withhold it from those it felt were undeserving.
In essence, Congress actually sold the word to the Olympic Committee, because back in 1978 the committee said that the government would end up losing money if they - the committee - couldn't regulate the term. And it's the only instance I know of where the government has given a private party exclusive rights over a single, "descriptive word."
After we hung up we realized what it was specifically, that had prompted us to call Mr. Weiss in the first place and what was adding immeasurably to our distress about the turning of a word into a commodity: an account we'd just come across in the San Francisco Examiner of a memorial service for Dr. Thomas Waddell, one of the defendant's in the USOC suit who had died of AIDS. (Dr. Waddell was the head of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.) The service was held in the rotunda of San Francisco's City Hall, and in the course of it Dr. Waddell's wife, Sara Lewinstein, announced that the USOC had officially removed a lien it had placed on Dr. Waddell's house to defray its legal cost in pursuing its case. Evidently the house, which Dr. Waddell has renovated himself, was his major asset, and he'd wanted to pass it on to his four year old daughter, Jessica. He died not knowing for certain whether he would be able to do so. The sad irony in all this is that Dr. Waddell was an Olympian. As a member of the decathlon team, he finished much more than respectable sixth, within shouting distance of the gold medalists, Bill Toomey. At the Mexico City Games Dr. Waddell supported the American sprinters John Carlos and Tommie Smith after they gave their clenched fists, Black Power salutes during the medal ceremony, and his conduct made the USOC angry. And as a physician in the Army, in the sixties, Dr. Waddell openly criticized this country's involvement in the Vietnam War; he came close to being court-martialed for his anti-war statements. Ultimately, Dr. Waddell became a tireless fighter for gay rights and gay pride. He was, it seems clear, a man with the courage of his convictions, and by all accounts he was a gentle, intelligent, and charming person. The one bright light among these gloomy events was Dr. Waddell's bravery in facing his illness. Everyone around him was awed and inspired by his will and humor and strength of character. His last words were "Well, this should be interesting."
[end of article]

Goodbye Dr. Waddell
Leo to Tom

Your courage of conviction was similar to mine. I believe we were brothers without so much as a 'how do you do.' I was reinforcements but too far back to help. You will go down in First Amendment history as an example that "Freedom for One is Freedom for All" and "Freedom for You was Freedom for Me."

Eulogy: July 12, 1987. Los Angeles Times, by Robert S. Weiss

Dr. Thomas Waddell, organizer of the Gay Olympics and a member of the U. S. decathlon team in 1968, died of complications related to AIDS on Saturday. He was 49. Waddell dies at his home in the company of his wife, Sara Lewinstein. Waddell and Lewinstein met at the first Gay Olympics in 1981. As president and founder of San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Waddell organized the sports competition for gays to help combat society's anxiety toward homosexuals. Waddell, a physician, once said he hoped the sporting event would be a visual antidote to the stereotypical images of "men with lisps who cross their legs like women, mince down the street and have wrist drop." Waddell, who came in sixth in the decathlon in the 1968 games in Mexico City, blamed bathhouses, pornography outlets, and sex boutiques for defining gay culture even though, in his view, they involved a minority of the gay community. A second Gay Olympics was held last year in San Francisco and was called the Gay Games II. Almost 3,500 athletes from around the world attended. The next Gay Games are scheduled to take place in 1990. Waddell's organization was forced to drop the word "Olympic" from the event's title after the U. S. Olympic Committee and the International Olympic Committee sued. "I've had an incredibly rich life. I don't feel like I've been cheated. I competed in the Olympics, I got my MD, traveled all over the world, pursued a couple of dreams, saw them come to fruition, not the least of which is my daughter," Waddell said last year in an interview with the Times. Eric Rofes, a friend, said Waddell was a driven, gentle man. "Thomas was committed to showing that gay people are a very diverse people. This is a tremendous loss, said Rofes, executive director of Hollywood's Gay and Lesbian Service Community Center. Waddell is survived by Sara Lewinstein, their 4-year-old daughter, Jessica, and his parents. [end of article] He passed away a few weeks after the Supreme Court decision in SFAA.

Chapter 29 Supreme Court Advocate and Counsel

Sometimes it is imperative that you buy and read the newspaper. The L.A. Times, Sunday, February 28, 1988, Part 1. I found this article - Lawyers at the Supreme Court (many columns). I found out about Michael H. Gottesman and soon retained him to be my Supreme Court counsel and/or advocate. His reported record at Supreme Court was thirteen (13) wins and one (1) loss. I contacted the firm of Bredoff & Kaiser and he responded. He agreed to be retained and after numerous letters between us he advises as follows:

Mike H. Gottesman of BREDHOFF & KAISER, Washington, D.C.
Transcript of telephone Conference

[Brackets are statements or questions by author]
Few brackets, you've heard enough of me. He is responsible for explaining things with sufficiency so I could decide to fold the legal tents and give it up. Thanks Mike, you made drowning feel like it was the thing to do.

[Ring]
Is this Leo LaBranche? [Yes (here it comes)]
Mr. Gottesman: I've spent a fair amount of time on this and feel deeply enough into it that I think can give you my views fairly clearly on it. Is this a good time to chat? [Yes]
Let me preface all this by saying I'm totally sympathetic to the situation you're in because it seems to me the decision in the gay olympics case was ridiculous, holding that protection extends to uses that are neither competing or conflicting, and in holding that the first amendment allows that, but, given that decision I think the chances of you getting cert. on the proposition that you're entitled to a trial on your equitable defenses here are very remote. I would put them in the one in fifty category. That is not surprising because the odds in any case of getting the S. Ct. to grant review are very small. They only hear roughly 150 cases a year and of that about thirty are appeals that they have no choice on, so their deciding to take about 120 cases a year and their criterion for selection is what are the 120 most important issues that America needs to have decided.
The one thing you have going for you in terms of their interest in this case is that statistically when you look at what they've done when they've decided a case in a particular area they've sort of got an interest in it. And so when another case comes along and you're able to say this case presents the issue that you didn't address in that prior case - it's a plus to be in an area that they've already exhibited an interest in. That you have. But what you have on the other side is what I think is very difficult. There are two or three things. Number 1: The surest road to get the S. Ct. to grant review is if you have a conflict among the circuits and most of the cases they grant each year out of those hundred and twenty or so, are cases where the issues come up a lot, and different courts of appeals have come up differently about it and your able to say, "Look you've got these courts of appeal in disagreement with each other you've got to step in here and resolve it." You don't have that here because yours is really the first case to come to a court of appeals involving the application of equitable defenses in the context of the Olympic committee.
The second problem you've got is that when you look at the equitable defenses laches is clearly a defense that any defendant can invoke in one of these cases. But laches requires that they know about you and that's the one [defense] the S. Ct. mentioned expressly in the footnote in the gay olympics case. Laches is, "they knew you were out there and they watched you do it and they didn't tell you about it and you relied heavily to your detriment on it." The court of appeals said they didn't know and the S. Ct. is not going to inquire behind that fact question. That's another thing about the S. Ct.. They're not at all interested in resolving factual questions. If the court of appeals said something they're just going to assume it's true. So laches is not available to you.
And the other two equitable defenses you're arguing, acquiescence and abandonment are in essence arguments, that if you won them, would totally undue what they held in the gay olympics case. Because what you're basically saying is that except as to the competing and conflicting uses they [USOC] have either or abandoned all other uses, by the fact that they haven't gone out and sued them. And so it is going to look to the Supreme Court like this issue is an effort to use equitable defenses is to totally undo what they worked so hard to do in the gay olympics case. Mind you that I think it was silly what they worked so hard to do - having done it they're not going to be, I think, sympathetic to entertaining an argument that there are equitable defenses that turn the thing completely around and will entitle every person who is using the name Olympic which is not conflicting or competing to get out.
And finally, wholly apart from the fact that it would undo what they decided in the gay olympics case, once you accept the logic of their decision in that case and you have to, how ever wrong it was, it is now the law of the land. The logic was one that would make these particular defenses not fit. Because the logic was the Olympic committee unlike everybody else who's got a trademark to protect, we're going to give them total possession of this trademark so that they can go out and sell it in the future in order to raise money to finance amateur athletics. So if they want to go and give somebody the right to put Olympic on underwear ten years from now, that's what Congress has chosen to give them. Their right to market this thing in the future. Once you understand that, it makes sense that in this context, but in no other trademark case that has ever come along before then, you wouldn't expect them to be running around suing people who are using the word Olympic on underwear now because it wouldn't be worth it to them to spend the money to do it. But if sometime down the road Fruit of the Loom said "we'll give you 30 million dollars if we can say this is the Official olympic underwear" at that point they would look up and say oh well now for the first time we have a real interest in this particular use. Now, nobody else in any other trademark context can make that kind of argument because nobody's given them the right to use the name to raise money, wholly apart from the product line. So the acq. & abandonment arguments, aside from the fact that there's no conflict in the circuit, and that it would undo what they ruled is the logic of their decision. And the logic of their decision suggests that these defenses unlike laches would be applicable here. All that's to say that it is always possible to write a cert. petition that sounds interesting and this is an interesting case. There is a petition to be written here that may peak their interest. But, I think, in the long run, my recommendation would be that you not undertake it. And I'll give you an idea what the costs would be entailed in doing that because ultimately this is not going to fly. Number 1 I think the chances of cert. being granted are small, no. 2, even if they were to grant it, because they're sort of interested in it, I think there's a heavy likelihood that you would lose in the Supreme Court. Because having granted it, and having thought about it -we already know where their biases lie on this issue, they made those clear in the gay olympics case. And if they sit there and think about these equitable defenses in the context of what their inevitable consequences would be, which is everybody using the word Olympic going to be able to invoke this defense . .
If they were to grant cert. they'll sit, they'll think, and they'll find a way to say yes you are entitled to the defenses of laches, of course that's personal to you, if they knew what you were doing (with their blessing) but when you proffer an equitable defense that applies to everybody in the world then your undoing what Congress tried to do with the statute. I think its a long shot for cert., and if cert. were granted you have to pour in a whole lot of more money, and, the odds, are heavier than they would normally be that your not going to win on the merits. So, I really think that ... Every choice like this is a cost-benefit analysis. Even if you win in the Supreme Court all you get is a trial in the district court. And you know that judge is proud to say he was on the panel that originally heard the gay olympics case. He regards himself as the great expert.

It's a three step process, first you go for cert.; then you've got to win it; then back to the trial court. Costs are 6-7k for printing. Then attorney's fees of 25k for Supreme Court counselor. You are a skilled writer so you could file a cert. petition pro-se but the chances of cert. being granted are substantially reduced. The quality of the lawyer you could pay to do this would vary and their fees would vary. Your chances are small at best but they get smaller if you're not paying somebody who's a Supreme Court expert. Our normal experience in what we charge, at the rates I quoted you before, about 25k range for writing a cert. petition. So you're looking 30-35k, roughly, and that's not an absolute, it could be less or more depending on how much time it would take to write it. That's your ballpark.
If cert. is granted the price goes up substantially, then you have to print the whole record; or at least all of it that's at all relevant, which is a much bigger printing cost. You're going to be paying a lawyer to brief on the merits. Lawyers tend to take a lot more time, cause now you've got to cover everything, (in a cert. petition you have to know enough of the law, tell them enough of the law to get them interested in, but you don’t have to persuade them that you're going to win). When you're on the merits, obviously, you have to cover the waterfront. Bigger lawyers fees, bigger printing fees and at that stage you're talking about paying the other sides printing expenses. They don't do this at the cert. petition but if cert's. granted the losing party in the Supreme Court has to pay the other sides printing costs. That means if you win they would pay your printing costs. So it's expensive stuff.

As I said, the fundamental problem that ultimately persuades me that this is not a venture worth pursuing is the bottom line that at two different levels the equitable defenses that are available here would totally undo the Gay Olympics case.
Number one, by definition if everybody can raise this defense then the decision in SFAA is overruled. The second problem I have with it which is it runs into the logic of the SFAA case because the logic, right or wrong, Congress made this very unusual choice, to give the Olympic committee the ownership of these words so that they could go out and sell it to whoever the wanted to raise money . .
Ordinarily we don't give anybody a trademark which says the word is yours, you can go out into totally unrelated fields and sell it just to raise money. But that Congress deliberately gave the Olympic Committee the trademark for that purpose. So they could raise money to finance amateur athletics. And that was indeed the principle rationale for why they (S.Ct) said it was alright under the first amendment. That this was such a nobel . .

[Oh, really! I didn't understand it that way. I thought that because the man was trying to have a competing amateur athletic competition called Olympics therefore it didn't violate his first amendment rights.]

No! They went further, - they could have decided that case without addressing your case at all. Except for the slight wrinkle that your name (Olympic Records) could be thought by some folks to not be totally disconnected to the Olympic games. I assume that was a certain whimsical irony in the original use of it. That incidentally is at a much smaller level (a little problem). If it were the Olympic chinese restaurant that would present the case more neatly.
[It is no problem. Olympic Records (Guinness) of athletes are copyrighted, published and owned by Bantam/Doubleday Books. Olympic Records and Tapes (retail) is in three states; Olympic Records Corp. is a business which stores business records for companies; the Olympic Record is the newsletter of the "Olympic Lobby," a/k/a National Association of Olympic Businesses." I have the only Olympic Records, in the class of recorded music.]

But in that case they didn't have to address the status of unconnected businesses at all because obviously the Gay Olympics was right in the mainstream of what was confusing and conflicting. So the Court went out of there way to do it. And not only did they go out of their way to do it when they construed the statute - because they said the statute is not limited to what the Lanham Act would do, when they got to the first amendment they then proceeded to give two rationales for why there was a governmental interest that justifies this: The first of those rationales is "who are you the gay olympics to be raising this." You're trying to profiteer off these people. "There is obviously the potential for confusion here in the (SFAA) case. But the second reason they gave was that there is a clear congressional interest in enabling them to market Olympic to raise money to support amateur athletics. And that interest is a special one. They're saying that in fact this was the intention of Congress. It's not clear from the opinion whether Congress said this or the court is inferring this. First they decided it reaches unrelated uses. Then they say 'well why would Congress want to reach unrelated uses.' It's obviously because Congress did say one of the purposes was to enable them to raise money. Given that rationale it isn't as though you overlooked something. Here we have a new argument that will cause you to re-think this. They've gone out of their way to assert this rationale which is, " it is a choice Congress logically could have made" - whether it did make it or not we don't know. They said Congress made it.

[Congress did not have this in mind, I have over 100 statements from legislators that this is not so and I was embarrassed and often scolded for suggesting the above reasoning.]

Given that rationale any equitable defenses which is everybody's and not just an individual company which got misled or snookered by them. "They knew about us and didn't tell us to stop." Any rationale which says everybody's free because they've allowed everybody to do it doesn't fly in the teeth of that rationale. The Supreme Court looks back and says: Well of course they're (USOC) not going to go after you NOW . . . They're only going to go after you when they want to use Columbia Records for the Olympic thing. You're on notice; you know what the statute says and you take your chances because if they ever want to get in the record business and they want to sell Columbia Records the rights for 30 million to use of the Olympic theme at that point they're entitled to look you up and say. Get out of the way!

[SO THEY HAVE A LAW SUPERIOR TO ANYTHING THAT
HAS EVER EXISTED BEFORE IN THIS COUNTRY.]

YES, THERE'S NO QUESTION, THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY DID.

That (SFAA) was an unfortunate test case. If you look for a case to take to the Supreme Court SFAA would not be the one. THE COURT CLEARLY WENT OUT OF ITS WAY TO CLOSE OFF THE WORLD and it is, unfortunately I think, if you watch the winter olympics this year, everybody left and right, up & down is talking about how can we raise more money to make America more competitive.
I think the Gay Olympics decision was wrong in construing what congress intended and even more wrong in the first amendment ruling. But I generally side with Brennan and Marshall of first amendment cases.

[They were the dissenters on the SFAA first amendment claim]

So the decision, it seems to me, is a debatable one in terms of its correctness. It was wrong. But they're not going to overturn it a year or two later. They clearly were committed, they went out of they're way to clear the landscape for the Olympic committee, far beyond the case they had before them, where they could have decided on the basis of conflicting use. And they've staked out this ground and you're just sort of climbing a mountain with a bear standing on the top, waiting for you to get there.
[silence]

My advice would be to fold the legal tents, at least. Obviously you may be able to convince Congress to change their minds. That's where I think the attention should be, and again I think you're running against the passion of the moment which is we got to find some way to raise more money. This has now become a respectable way to raise money for worthy causes. Easier to make the corporations give it to then than to tax the public.

[Yes, but corporations use million dollars in donations as deductions from their corporate tax, the people still pay for it, it's just not obvious. Thanks for everything Mike, let me call you . . .]

Transcript of telephone conference with Honorable Michael H. Gottesman.

PART VII

Chapter 30

Washington: On More Time Cafeteria highly recommended, otherwise . . . .

I have to go to Washington D.C. again. The Supreme Court will hand down its opinion on SFAA before the end of the session and there's a week left. Odd that I started here and it's about to end here. This is the stuff of Martians, and Mother Goose. A motel with railroad tracks behind, no wonder I got a good rate. Every ten minutes it was a 5 point earthquake occurring and this was 24/7 except for a break between 2 and 4 am.
The best thing about the Supreme Court was the cafeteria and those blueberry muffins. I got to sit with my back to Chief Justice Rhenquist (I certainly didn't want to face him). I had a reservation and got there early so it was allowed to eat muffins with the greats. One magic moment did however occur on this supreme court day and I was to meet and shake hands with a one of the American greats of all time.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(The Wallaby court)
SFAA v. USOC and IOC*

* [Why were they left off this caption?
They started this with my judge on appeal in IOC v. SFAA]
Argued March 24, 1987 - Decided June 25th, 1987

SYLLABUS-

Preface: The syllabus constitutes no part of the Opinion but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. He or she needs a new job.

Author declares what is 'prepared' herein is not even close with what was actually decided.

Supreme Court Opinion
HERE THEY GO: A one way ticket to Mars.

Supreme Court: Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (Act) grants respondent USOC the right to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word Olympic and various other symbols. Petitioner, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), a non-profit California corporation, promoted the "Gay Olympic Games" to beheld in 1982 by using those words on its letterheads and mailings, in local newspapers, and on various merchandise sold to cover the costs of the Games. The USOC informed the SFAA of the existence of the Act and requested that it terminate use of the word "Olympic" in description of the planned Games. When the SFAA failed to do so, the USOC brought suit in Federal District Court for injunctive relief. The Court granted the USOC a summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Act granted the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use was confusing and without regard to defenses available to an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham Act. The court also found that the USOC'S property right in the word and its associated symbols and slogans can be protected without violating the first amendment. The court did not reach the SFAA's claim that the USOC's enforcement of its rights was discriminatory in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it held that the USOC is not a governmental actor to which the Constitution applies.

THE COURT Held: Italics are author's comments and appraisals and disgust.

S. Ct: 1. There is no merit to the SFAA'a contention that §110 grants the USOC nothing more than a trademark in the word "Olympic" and precludes its use by others only when it tends to cause confusion. Nor is there any merit to the argument that §110's reference to Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating traditional defenses as well.
* SFAA'S contention and argument has great merit. So far, five sentences, mistake #1. I know this from direct experience through Congressional communications over a time frame of two years. I was ridiculed on some occasions and sometimes admonished for stating what the Court just articulated in the first five sentences of this opinion. Congress never intended this interpretation and had no idea it was going to occur.

S. Ct. Section 110's language and legislative history indicate that Congress intended to grant the USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, and that §110 does not incorporate defenses available under the Lanham Act. mistake 2 Same contention as above*

S. Ct. 2. Also without merit is the SFAA'a argument that the word "Olympic" is a generic word that constitutionally cannot gain trademark protection under the Lanham Act,
(not true but not a mistake since the Court is blissfully ignorant of facts not before it. There were five (5) thousand businesses, corporations, and organizations in legal effect at that moment in time and SFAA is correct in their contention that Olympic is generic and property of the Public domain but has no proof in the record, so it's their word and it has no weight.)

S. Ct. and that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trademark in a word. When a word acquires values the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the commercial and promotional value of the word Olympic was the product of the USOC's talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense.
This does not apply as the doctrine of "secondary meaning" and USOC has no more right to a secondary meaning appellation than do the five (5) thousand existing business using olympic in their name at this moment which have been doing so for over 35 years, since the inception of the Amateur Act. These businesses are present and accounted for every day of the year using their talent, energies, and capital to develop their businesses, services, and products with their good will attached.

S. Ct. In view of the history of the origins and associations of the word "Olympic" Congress' decision to grant the USOC a limited property right in the word falls within the scope of the trademark law protections, and thus within Constitutional bounds.
Who wrote this (syllabus) opinion? There is a 'galaxy' of space between a limited property right and a blanket prohibition. This syllabus contradicts the decision within the same paragraph. This Court is granting exclusive right; a blanket prohibition that my dear 'gang of nine' is not limited but unlimited, which is forbidden at any and all junctures and junctions when it comes even slightly near the Constitution. And what's this trash about trademark law protections when you are not allowed trademark law defenses. Now we are deep in Martian Law. Congress cannot 'cut and paste' the Lanham Act and it did not; you get it all or you get none. Congress didn't do it - I know for a fact. It was as much a surprise to Congress as it was to me and I'm sure to SFAA. Now we're at mistake 3. Limited property right, my caboose.

S. Ct. 3. The first amendment does not prohibit Congress from granting exclusive use of a word without requiring that the authorized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause confusion. The SFAA claims that its use of the word Olympic was intended to convey a political statement about the status of homosexuals in society, and that §110 may not suppress such speech. However by prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, neither Congress or the USOC has prohibited the SFAA from conveying it's message. Section 110's restrictions on expressive speech are properly characterized as incidental to the primary Congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding the USOC's activities. Congress has a broad public interest in promoting, through the USOC's activities, the participation of amateur athletics from the United States in the Olympic Games. Even though §110's protection may exceed traditional rights of a trademark in certain circumstances,
This makes me mad as hell. It is not in 'certain circumstances,' it is in 'all circumstances.' Here again the syllabus and Court trips over its own 'minced' words, hiding behind modest assertions that do not reflect what their opinion actually decided. So it's the syllabuses fault, right. I've given up on calling anything forthcoming a mistake, three are sufficient.

S. Ct. the Act's application to commercial speech is not broader than necessary to protect legitimate Congressional interests and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.
Take a pole of the 2500 companies and corporations present in my federal case record and see if this "ridiculous" statement is true as to their pre-existing first amendment rights. And then pole the 2,500 or so that are not in my case record. Talk about a revolution. There could be 5,000 entities exercising their collective first amendment rights and exorcise the USOC out of our existence, federal charter and all.

S. Ct. Congress reasonably could find that the use of the word by other entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use.
Again the Court couches its reasonable statements in relation to an athletic event such as SFAA but will determine an exclusive prohibition for all users of Olympic for the purpose of trade. If you're going to come out and prohibit everyone then why not have the guts to say it.

S. Ct. The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to purely commercial use, does not give it First Amendment right to appropriate the value which the USOC's efforts have given the word.
No more than the 'value' the 2500 businesses in my court record puts upon their efforts to maintain their business or company name, and likely a lot less.

S. Ct. 4. The SFAA's claim that the USOC has enforced its §110 rights in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Fifth Amendment fails, because the USOC is not governmental actor to whom the Fifth Amendment applies. The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does not render the USOC a government agent. Moreover, Congress' intent to help the USOC obtain government funding does not change the analysis. Nor does the USOC's perform functions that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the Federal Government. The USOC's choice of how to enforce its exclusive rights to use the word "Olympic" simply is not a governmental decision.
LUNACY: Stupid, stupid, stupid, as Andy Taylor would say. How can the U. S. government, any separated federal branch, not be concerned with how a federal law is implemented and enforced, especially as it affects their policies, their agency, and their liabilities. The Amateur Act is now the reformed and majestic super-sized law as created and re-invented by the Supreme Court. One eye blind and the other on historical perspective, "being up there with other saviors of olympism, Olympique, and the Amateur Sports Act." There is a place reserved for them in the "Mount Olympus Hall of Shame and Absurdity." This shameful and biased ruling had a direct effect upon me, my case, my present, my future, my family, and my belief in the federal judicial process. This 'decision' has affected me for over 22 years. And there is no way to appeal a Martian decision, since there's no one left to appeal to. That seems to 'work' rather well.

End of Martian Law and Supreme Court Syllabus of Opinion.

I will not waste time, energy, heart, and soul even speaking to the 25 pages of gobbelygook which follows this syllabus. This opinion is not only wrong, it is ALL wrong. A couple of dissenters were correct on first amendment issues but matter not in the hodgepodge of rhetoric.

Weak, gutless, uninformed, dastardly biased, and patently unconstitutional. The court was duped and could only see the by the light of the olympic torch; and the deniable homophobia which resulted in a ruling that should be torn out of the reports. It's not even fit for tinder, and is more wrong now, 22 years later, than it ever was.

In closing: The opinion stinks of bias and special privilege with just a dash of historical perspective. Well, that about does it for me. What year is this? (1987)

Chapter 31 Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee

On the fateful day of the ruling by the Court I was there waiting pronouncement. I had reservation and had a seat. In the front row were two Congressmen, Senator John Danforth and Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr., I did not know, until later when it was announced at session's end, that Peter Rodino, III [along with other attorneys] were to be inducted into the bar of the Supreme Court, a process necessary if you intend to practice before the Court. I would think it would be a great honor. Mr. Danforth and Mr. Rodino were his sponsors. It was a happy day for the senior Rodino. As the session ended he retired alone to aisle right and I went to congratulate him on this auspicious occasion. I did NOT identify myself to enable him to enjoy this moment without some litigant and lobbyist bothering him about an issue which he could not discuss anyway. I later contacted him about meeting him and he was gracious, as always, and sent me a File Copy of the Legislative Intent regarding the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. He was the only Congressman I had any face contact with though I had mail contact with all of them, an infinitum. I had several communications with him as Judiciary Chairman. I got something from my "day in court" after all. Like meeting George Washington or one of those guys.

Thank you Mr. Rodino, the honor was all mine.

I had this Legislative Intent document for several years but to get a File Copy from him was special. And, of course, there is no reference whatsoever to the Amateur Sports Act being enforced in any way, shape or form as the USOC and the martian court is now trying to pass off on us, and directly on to me.

Bio of Mr. Rodino (imported text)
Mr. Rodino was born Pelligrino Rodino, Jr. in Newark, New Jersey. His parents were immigrants from Italy. He attended Barringer High School. He went to college at the University of Newark and earned a law degree at the Newark Law School, both now part of Rutgers University. During World War II, he earned a Bronze Star for service in Italy and North Africa. After the war, he ran an unsuccessful campaign for Congress in 1946, losing to incumbent Fred Hartley Jr. Trying again in 1948, when Hartley had decided not to run, he won the seat. Outside of his Newark district, he was not prominent as a congressman until the Nixon impeachment hearings. As a congressman, he was generally known as a liberal, and a proponent of civil rights legislation and immigration reform. Representing a district that was heavily Italian-American when he was first elected, he was best known for his sponsorship of legislation that made Columbus Day a national holiday.
He became chairman of the House Judiciary Committee in January 1973. During the Nixon impeachment hearings from May to July 1974, he was generally considered to be a fair moderator of what at times were very partisan hearings. Key difficulties included ensuring that enough Republican committee members would vote for impeachment to defend against Nixon administration charges of Democratic partisanship. In the end, as further evidence emerged and Nixon admitted wrongdoing, several initially reluctant Republican members switched, making the committee vote for impeachment unanimous. During his political career, he also was one of the managers of the impeachment hearings of a pair of federal judges. In 1986, he was member of the committee that removed Nevada judge Harry Claiborne for tax evasion, and in 1988, he helped to remove future Congressman Alcee Hastings from a Florida court due to perjury charges. He continued as chair of the Judiciary Committee until his retirement from Congress in 1989, when he was replaced by Donald M. Payne, New Jersey's first African-American representative. After leaving Congress, he became professor emeritus at the Seton Hall University School of Law, where he taught and lectured until February 2005. He died May 7, 2005, of congestive heart failure at the age of 95 at his home in West Orange, New Jersey.


Chapter 32

Dear O-w-impic Letter
National Association of Olympic Businesses
A Non-Profit Business Association
Lobby Registration #11271000 - IRS § 501(c)(6) - Tax Exempt - 33-0200292

This last utterance went out to the 2,500 +/- olympic businesses present in my court record. From these addresses I obtained my members who joined the lobby. These recipients received letters from me several times before and were on the Olympic list. I should not have been angry with these people, specifically, but the last screw was going in my coffin lid and I had to reach one more time to convince them the urgency of the issue, and, that the martyr will soon die for his beliefs, figuratively. Olympic Records is dead and its products are going to the shredder. National Association of Olympic Businesses is to be dissolved and Martian law has prevailed. The culmination of four years of sixty (60) hour weeks dedicated 101% to the cause (like the first judge said, quixotic quest) of obtaining the trademark with which I was going to make a stand for music "I" thought the Public should have access to. Four years in court, six years in all. My extremely valuable and costly court record now goes to storage to become a cold case file, or more likely, the dumpster. There are copies but it would require a legal anthropologist to locate the original. And for God's sake don't show it to the Supreme Court if you find it.

. . . cries carnivorous predator & scavenger one last time

Dear O-WIM-PIC:

Guess what? I went to the U.S. appeals court Monday (7th) and the Gay Olympics case disposes of LABRANCHE v. USOC and you are hereby notified that you will never be free unless you do something about it. Some of you may have made an effort and, if so, those efforts need to be redoubled. For those of you who ignored my letters or feel your company is not in jeopardy and don't feel threatened I wish you well. If any of you made a secret arrangement with the USOC you are dangerously close to a Sherman Act, §1 violation. Any of you who changed your name should move to France where this .... came from. I shall continue to the Supreme Court where I can further and finally be destroyed and insulted, and there is no chance they will change their mind with respect to overturning one of their most notorious mistakes. The mistake was that they (7 justices) said "section 380 of the Amateur Sports Act does not violate the First Amendment." This was stated in the broadest of terms and the statement is meant to, and does, apply to everyone. The Supreme Court of "Olympism" showed the Gays and the ACLU who's boss.

The National Association of Olympic Businesses [NAOB] will be disbanded and dissolved at the end of the quarter and thereafter the actions of Leo O. LaBranche Jr. will not reflect upon or include any of the members. I am taking out of court actions against the I.O.C. (which is responsible for this crap) and the games have begun. In fact, the Canadians (who have ten times the spine of most of you) took the matter into their own hands and made the government change the policy regarding 'no use' of olympic, but only because the Canadian olympic businesses stood up and fought (with special help from the Greek Canadians and the Greek Ambassador). I played a small part in that event. The Canadian media howled when the Canadian Olympic Association a/k/a the Olympic Trust tried to prevent publication of the country's major magazine (McLeans). The magazine was taken to Federal court and lost at every turn until the issue smelled so bad that the Olympic Trust dropped the injunction. It is interesting that I can be of assistance to help others free themselves from oppression but I can't do a damn thing about it in my own country. It would take at least five (5) hundred or more American olympic businesses joined together in a federal class action to be "EQUAL UNDER LAW TO THE USOC." Everybody bows to the USOC, including you and yours who tacitly bow by accepting the situation.

Good-bye and Good Luck. I am ashamed that my countrymen are such spineless wimps.
Truly O-WIM-PICS.

President, Olympic Records, Inc.

P.S. Courtesy, protocol, and procedure mean absolutely nothing in this situation. If you want something done by this government you must DEMAND IT! Do you pay taxes? What do you get for it? You are a tainted American business and through absolutely no fault of mine, and I thank God. End of Final Olympic Utterance


NEW YORK TIMES
Ten days after the Court's decision in SFAA the following statements were made by the
Executive director of the Olympic Committee, Mr. George Miller.
New York Times - July 5, 1987, section 3, pg. 1:5

Publicly stated position SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
With the Olympic Games approaching the Committee will be more aggressive about protecting its exclusive right to the word "Olympic." Any use of the name is illegal," said George Miller, executive director. [But] we can't go after them all. The main targets will be athletic contests and businesses that link themselves to the Olympic Games . . .

The statement in italics accurately reflects the intention of Congress with respect to interpretation of § 380 of the Amateur Sports Act. Further statements made by the USOC regarding legislative intent appear in the records of the 99th Congress. 100 video copies (and transcripts) of a network television broadcast were sent to members of Congress, accompanying petition 0274, in 1986. On this broadcast appeared Mr. Richard G. Kline, Esq., general counsel for USOC, holding a souvenier T-shirt up to view which included the five interlocked rings and the term 1984 Olympics and stated: This is the kind of marketing activity the statute was designed to prevent. This statement is also true and in harmony with Congressional Intent. Yet threats were made during the broadcast to sue all those who use the word "olympic" for the purposes of trade since 1950. The Amateur Sports Act states "olympic" is a word, not a name.

So the USOC has a federal law that cannot be used against all others, and used when it suits their purpose and design and they have a Supreme Court opinion (case law) to enable them to do what, where, and when they choose with no control or oversight according to the Martian court. The people in this organization need to get out of MY country. Nowhere in the history of our laws (show me otherwise) has any entity ever had this kind of power, implemented by self-serving men and women with no oversight necessary. The gods have finally arrived from Mount Olympus and they're as superlative as always and do what they want with no oversight.

This, in effect, ends the Olympic story. I obeyed the federal court order and shredded my products, canceled my licenses, closed the Corporation, and closed the Lobby. Below the written Order, of course written by the Olympic lawyers and signed by the judge.

JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
U. S. District Court, case no. CV 481 RG LABRANCHE v USOC
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and over the parties to this action;

2. Plaintiff (counterdefendant/LABRANCHE) shall take nothing by his claims.

3. The use by LABRANCHE of the term "Olympic Records" as a trademark and/or as a trade name on or in connection with his products infringes upon the rights in and to use the term "OLYMPIC" granted to the USOC by 36 U.S. Code section 380.

4. LABRANCHE, his successors, legal representatives, and assigns, and his agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with LABRANCHE are perpetually enjoined and restrained:

A) from using the term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS" or any other word or words, term or terms which is or are confusingly similar thereto, as a trademark, trade name, brand name, or indication of source or origin on or in connection with any product or any service and/or the advertising, offering for sale or the sale of any product or service;
B) from using the term "OLYMPIC" alone, and or as a part of any trademark containing other words or devices, and/or trade name, trade style, or designation which includes the word "OLYMPIC;" and
C) from committing any acts calculated or likely to cause others to believe that the products or services of LABRANCHE are the USOC's products or services, or are sponsored or approved by, or connected with or produced under the supervision of USOC.

5. LABRANCHE is further enjoined and ordered to:
A) destroy any and all of his labels, packaging, and other documents and material which include the Term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS;"
B) destroy any and all of his advertising materials which include, refer, or relate to use of the term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS" on or in connection with its product or services;
C) take such action as is necessary to cause removal from any and all directories or publications of any and all references to LABRANCHE or his product or services which include the term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS;"
D) abandon his U. S. Trademark Application Serial No. S452,602 and abandon or otherwise cancel or revoke any other Federal, state or foreign trademark application or registrations which he may have for any mark which includes the term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS;"
E) cancel or cause to be cancelled any and all trade name certificates, registrations, or fictitious name statements which include the term "OLYMPIC or "OLYMPIC RECORDS" and which have been issued or granted to LABRANCHE; and
F) cancel or cause to be cancelled any and all certificates of brand or label approval from any brand or label which include the term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS," and which have been granted or issued to him.

6. LABRANCHE is further ordered to account to USOC, and to pay to USOC all gains, profits and advantages derived from his sale of goods or services in connection with which he has used the term "OLYMPIC" or "OLYMPIC RECORDS" as an identifying designation or otherwise.

7. This Court retains jurisdiction of the parties hereto with respect to compliance with this Permanent Judgement against LABRANCHE.

8. That the USOC recover of LABRANCHE its costs, including attorneys' fees.


Dated: 12/31/85 - mandated 4-4-88 s/s Richard A. Gadbois Jr.
United States District Judge


I located a company in Arizona which will shred my company products and other items as covered in the above ORDER. I get my friend Billy Milo, the country artist, to go with me to Arizona and get him to film it, as required, to show and prove the destruction. It was about a 5 x 8 U-haul full of records and tapes and whatever else required to go to the shredder. I go to Arizona because I will not spend any money in California ever again.
I left California shortly thereafter and moved to Arizona where I considered a future as Don Coyote chasing "The Impossible Curse." I could not consider a book as was suggested by Mr. Lewis M. Brown because I couldn't go through it again. I kept the 150 pounds of history for some reason but thought I was just dragging my past.

The foregoing began August 1982 and ended April 1988. It is highly not recommended that anyone do this unless you are steeped in, and expect to be ruled by, Martian law. Don't forget, I'm just a member of the Public and it could have been You.
Epilogue to follow